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MANSLAUGHTER AND MOSAICISM IN EARLY
CONNECTICUT
DAVID H. WRINN*
The distinction between murder and manslaughter is both a hallmark
of the common law and a doctrine of longstanding in Anglo-American juris-
prudence. Nevertheless, the Puritan Commonwealth of Connecticut did not
formally recognize such a distinction until 1719, the better part of a cen-
tury after settlement. Connecticut purported to ground its criminal law, and
especially its capital sanctions, exclusively upon the Mosaical Law of
Scripture.
The thesis that early New England law was fundamentally Bible law
long ago fell to detailed scrutiny of the several early colonial legal codes.'
There is now little doubt that English law was a much-used model for many
colonial enactments, and that the legal proceedings employed throughout
this period exhibit anything but the operation of some rough and rustic
"popular law" which Reinsch and other scholars at the beginning of this
century asserted was characteristic of seventeenth century New England
justice.2 Nevertheless, while subsequent research has exposed the relative
* B.A. Dickinson College, A.M., Brown University, J.D., The University of Connecticut
School of Law, LL.M., Yale Law School. Of the Connecticut bar. The author gratefully ac-
knowledges the assistance of the late R.M. Cover, of the Yale Law School, in critiquing this
article in its final stages, and wishes to thank H.C. Macgill, of the University of Connecticut
School of Law, R.P. Dupont and W.B. Perlmutter, of the Connecticut bar, for their advice and
their review of earlier drafts.
1. E.g., Woodbine, Book Review, 43 YALE L.J. 1036, 1042 (1934) (reviewing S. MORI-
SON, RECORDS OF THE SUFFOLK COUNTY COURT, 1671-1680). Woodbine sees little evidence of
Biblicism in the records and concludes that "undoubtedly the influence of that law as an active
legal force in their [the New England colonies] civilization has been greatly overstated." See
also Chafee, Colonial Courts and the Common Law, in 67 MASSACHUSETrS HISTORICAL SOCI-
ETY PROCEEDINGS 132 (1952); Haskins, A Problem in the Reception of the Common Law in
the Colonial Period, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 842, 843 (1948-1949).
2. Reinsch, The English Common Law in the Early American Colonies, in I SELECT
ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 367, 370 (1907) [hereinafter SELECT ESSAYS];
Hilkey, Legal Developments in Colonial Massachusetts, 1630-1686, in 37 Columbia Studies
in History, Economics and Public Law (1910) [hereinafter COLUMBIA STUDIES]; R. POUND,
THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW (1921). These scholars viewed the history of early colonial
law as very much an express rejection of the common law, and that only much later, in the
eighteenth century, was there any significant reception of that law in American courts. Both
Reinsch and Hilkey based their work chiefly on Massachusetts records. Of the Connecticut
and New Haven colonies the former remarked that "[i]f possible, these colonies departed even
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complexity of the law of that time, it has not entirely vitiated the proposi-
tion that in certain respects the influence of scripture in that law was pre-
eminent. The continuous reenactment of what has come to be seen as a
subcode of biblically framed and referenced Capitall Lawes is neither easily
overlooked nor explained-, and the student of early colonial court records is
further from the common law than Massachusetts in their system of popular courts . . . dis-
cretion of the magistrates, and in the case of New Haven, the clear and unequivocal assertion
of the binding force of divine law as a common law in all temporal matters. ... I SELECT
ESSAYS at 387. Hilkey concluded that "[tihe colonists did not consider English law binding.
The statutes passed by the General Court were to them the positive, and the Scriptures the
subsidiary law. Just so much of the English law was adopted, therefore, as the General Court
chose to incorporate in its orders, or this court and the other judicial authorities saw fit to
recognize in their decisions." 37 COLUMBIA STUDIES at 144. Both Reinsch's and, to a lesser
extent, Hilkey's work was based primarily upon statutory research and not upon detailed study
of the surviving court records. A more balanced treatment of the Massachusetts materials is
found in E. POWERS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS, 1620-1692, (1966).
See generally G. HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS (1960).
3. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 61 (1973), explains that, although the
"subcodes" of capital laws-subcodes because of their prominent position in the legal codes of
the day and because of their biblically referenced provisions unlike other provisions in the
same codes-were used as "prime evidence" for the Bible law theory, these were but a small
part of colonial law and even less of the criminal law of the time; that English law could have
been cited as readily as Scripture in support of the provisions; and that much selection was
involved in the enactment of these provisions, reflecting local needs and conditions. Though in
the main conceded, these points really beg the question; they do not account for the hold of
this manner of framing the law of serious crime on New England legal thought for a time well
past that when there is general agreement that the common law had become well-entrenched.
The caution with which this topic should be approached is amply illustrated in Morris,
Massachusetts and the Common Law: The Declaration of 1646, 31 AM. HIST. REV. 443
(1925-1926), a provocative reassessment of the General Court's response to the notorious
Child Remonstrance (1646). Dr. Child and four other petitioners had complained of the dis-
cretionary powers of the Bay colony's magistrates and the lack of a book of laws with fixed
penalties. They made note of the fact that despite the rights and immunities granted by the
Crown charter and the understanding that Massachusetts would make no laws repugnant to
those of England, "We cannot, according to our judgments, discerne a settled forme of govern-
ment according to the lawes of England, which may seeme strange to our countrymen, yea to
the whole world, especially considering we are all English." A COLLECTION OF ORIGINAL PA-
PERS RELATIVE TO THE HISTORY OF THE COLONY OF MASSACHUSETTS-BAY 190 (T. Hutchin-
son comp.) (Boston 1769) [hereinafter COLLECTION], reprinted as Hutchinson Papers, in I
PUBLICATIONS OF THE PRINCE SOCIETY 216 (Boston 1865) (repint 1967). The commission
appointed by the General Court to answer these charges published its Declaration, comparing
selected aspects of the settlement's law with that of England in an attempt to rebut accusa-
tions of a lack of conformity. Morris concludes that the "Pentateuchal motif' in Puritan law
has been unfairly trivialized, considering the General Court's protestations of conformity in the
Declaration, which he characterizes as "not a fair presentation of fundamental law in this
constructive period" [i.e., Massachusetts in the 1640's]. Morris, Massachusetts and the Com-
mon Law: The Declaration of 1646, 31 AM. HIST. REV. at 446 & 452. See also R. WALL,
MASSACHUSETTS BAY: THE CRUCIAL DECADE, 1640-1650, at 166 (1972). Wall concludes that
the designed purpose of the Declaration was "to mollify any English critics of Massachusetts
Bay," in light of the fact that the petitioners were threatening to go to England with their case
against the colonial government. Id. at 179.
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continually reminded of the extent to which scriptural references and us-
ages permeate the whole, particularly the reports of criminal proceedings.
The question is less whether there was ever some monolithic Bible Law in
force at any time in the seventeenth century New England settlements,
than that of the impact of scripture upon patterns of legal thinking, given
what is known of the social, intellectual and political climate of that time.'
I propose to trace the introduction of manslaughter doctrine into the
law of the Connecticut colony in an effort to reveal the mechanisms by
which in the eighteenth century a Mosaically-grounded homicide law came
to be transformed into one more purposefully of common law origin. The
reasons for focusing upon homicide of all the capital laws for the period are
several. First, the sample of cases is marginally larger than for other cate-
gories of capital crime in this period. Secondly, the study of Mosaicism as a
distinctive attitude toward the secular law is not advanced by the examina-
tion of religious crimes, like blasphemy, which, moreover, have an associa-
tion with the ecclesiastical court system in early modern England. Finally,
and of the greatest importance to the study of Mosaicism as a distinct juris-
prudence is the fact that in this area of the criminal law the divergences
between the common law and scripture are doctrinally distinct, owing to the
peculiarities of the crime of manslaughter.
The present study of the Connecticut colony arises from certain pecu-
liarities of time, place and practice. Most significant of the latter is Con-
necticut's distinction as the only Puritan settlement (aside from that at
New Haven prior to its absorption by Connecticut in 1665) in which benefit
of clergy, a prominent feature of contemporary English homicide law, never
operated.6 The absence of this doctrine at very least suggests that some
force other than the common law of crimes animated Connecticut's homi-
4. W. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 37 (1975), argues from the
Massachusetts trial records of the 1760's that "the continuing vitality of lingering puritanical
standards is seen most clearly in the law of crime," and that "the criminal law was concerned
primarily with protecting community religious and moral values . . . to give legal effect to the
community's sense of sin and to punish those who breached the community's taboos."
5. G. DALZELL, BENEFIT OF CLERGY IN AMERICA AND RELATED MATTERS 215 (1955).
The doctrine operated to spare the life of the defendant, for in England manslaughter, as
felony, was punishable by death. Originally, only those in holy orders could make the plea, it
having jurisdictional significance in that its granting removed the case to the ecclesiastical
courts where the death penalty could not be imposed. Proof of holy orders was the ability to
read scripture and this practice opened the plea to all who could read, though laity could have
their clergy but once. The reading test was later abolished altogether. Eventually, the common
law courts administered the case after a successful plea had been entered. See J.H. BAKER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 422-424 (2d ed. 1979); 1 B. CHAPIN, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN COLONIAL AMERICA, 1606-1660, at 48-50 (1983). Connecticut's first manslaughter
act (1719) was thereby anomalous in prescribing a non-capital penalty for the crime. The act
is found in 6 PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT 144 (C. Hoadly ed. 1872)
[hereinafter CONN. RECS.].
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cide law. Moreover, during this period, coinciding in its earliest stages with
the Interregnum in England, there was serious Puritan agitation in Parlia-
ment for, among other proposals, the reform of certain of the criminal laws.
Evidence of the transatlantic migration of ideas at this time is unexcep-
tional enough to warrant drawing the inference that reformist platforms in
the England of the 1640's and 1650's may reveal something of the motives
of lawmakers in Puritan New England where, as is the case in Connecticut,
the surviving records raise unusual questions but provide nothing that we
might call a legislative history.
Finally, the very isolation and freedom from any direct Crown interfer-
ence which characterized the early history of the Connecticut colony allow
for a view of records spanning a longer period of time and undergoing more
subtle changes than is possible, for example, in Massachusetts, where
Crown control over the machinery of government and legal administration
brought about substantial conformity to English laws as early as the 1690's.
This insularity allowed Connecticut, over the course of the seventeenth cen-
tury, the freedom to monitor not only how much but how English law
would be received as circumstances required. Thus, in a most singular fash-
ion, the colony enacted common-law manslaughter into law by express stat-
ute, a thoroughly unnecessary action considering that the doctrine's appli-
cability had already been decided and allowed on appeal.'
In reconstructing the homicide law of early Connecticut, and in weigh-
ing the relative strengths of scriptural and common law influences, I shall
endeavor to highlight both the convergences and divergences between the
force and intent of the printed law and the actual proceedings before Con-
necticut tribunals. I think it is demonstrable that the peculiarities of this
colony's homicide law are directly attributable to the lingering hold of bibli-
cism over its legal proceedings, and that the chief mechanism for change
was the virtually limitless but nonetheless circumspect application of magis-
terial discretion.
6. On appeal, the use of the doctrine was allowed as early as 1712. M. Horwitz, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 13 (1977), sees this case as "[olne of the
few suggestions that colonials had any qualms about imposing criminal punishments without a
statute .. " As I shall attempt to demonstrate, the reservation in this instance did anticipate
"some modern conception of the primary legitimacy of statute law," id., and does imply some
doubt about how much of the common law they were entitled to use, id., but thatthis particu-
lar case is sui generis at least; and at most, the doubt that it engendered derived more from
the competing claims of another source of law than the more limited concern of how much of
the law of England should be applied.





For a quarter century after its founding at Hartford (1637), the Con-
necticut settlement lacked any kind of charter or other formal recognition
from the Crown. 7 The Fundamental Orders (1638) which the settlers
drafted in no way defined relations with the sovereign." The Orders pledged
to form a government "to maintain and preserve the liberty and purity of
the gospel of our Lord Jesus. . . ."' The tenth provision of this quasi-con-
stitutional document endeavored to guarantee the independence of the relig-
iously inspired polity. It established a General Court as the "supreme power
of the Commonwealth," granting it sole authority to make laws or repeal
them. 10 In addition, the public officers constituted themselves a Particular
Court to administer justice in accordance with the "Lawes here established
and for want thereof according to the rule of the Word of God.""
The extent to which the Mosaical Law or Lex Mosis (that is, those
laws regarding conduct to be gleaned from the Pentateuch) formed the
foundation of the infant commonwealth's legal system readily appears in its
first statute, a list of Captiall Lawes, promulgated by the General Court in
December, 1642. The members of the General Court took as their source
Article Ninety-four of the Massachusetts Body Of Liberties (1641), which
consisted of a series of capital provisions with Old Testament authorities
annexed to its margins. Unlike their brethren in New Haven who were also
but recently out of the Bay Colony, they made no wholesale incorporation
of the language of the Massachusetts statute. The Connecticut draftsmen
made two excisions in the language of Article Ninety-four. They deleted
7. Connecticut did not receive a charter from the Crown until 1662.
8. The Fundamental Orders, in I FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 519-22 (F.N. Thorpe ed. 1909). "They omitted, ei-
ther intentionally or unintentionally, all reference to their royal sovereign across the seas and
seem to have wished to cut themselves off from all connection with English authority and
English law." C. ANDREWS, THE BEGINNINGS OF CONNECTICUT, 1632-1662, at 47 (1934).
Parliament had not been sitting-it would not again until 1640-and Charles I was not con-
sidered likely to have granted a charter agreeable to Connecticut's Puritans. I N. OSBORN,
HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT IN MONOGRAPHIC FORM 5 (1925).
9. 1 CONN. REcs. 21.
10. Id.; cf Fundamental Agreement of New Haven (1639), Query V: "and the power of
making laws according to the word..." I F.N. Thorpe, supra note 8, at 525. For the central
place of scripture in their law see Query I: "Whether the scriptures do hold forth a perfect
rule for the direction and government of all men in all duties which they are to perform to God
and men, as well in families and commonwealth, as in matters of the church?" Id. at 523.
I1. 1 CONN. REcS. 26. The settlement at New Haven, on October 25, 1639 decreed
"thatt the worde of God shall be the onely rule to be attended unto in ordering the affayres of
government in this plantatio[n]." I RECORDS OF THE COLONY AND PLANTATION OF NEW HA-
VEN 21 (C. Hoadly ed.) (Hartford 1857) [hereinafter New Haven Records].
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altogether section five which read: "If any person slayeth an other sud-
dainely in his anger or crueltie of passion, he shall be put to death."12 Addi-
tionally, they removed the word "premeditated" from the murder provision
which read: "If any person committ any wilfull murther, which is man-
slaughter, committed upon premeditated mallice, hatred, or Crueltie, not in
a mans necessarie and just defence, nor by meere casualtie against his will,
he shall be put to death.""8
Why did they make these changes? Contemporary sources do not ad-
dress the point. Having taken so much of the Massachusetts statute, why
did they object to the homicide provisions? Certainly, the deletion of an
entire crime and the alteration of the language of another are indicative of
close scrutiny of the fine points of Article Ninety-four's language. One stu-
dent of the period has characterized these changes as an attempt to resolve
the inherent contradictions between scripture and the common law,14 but
this suggestion does not account for what the Connecticut drafters might
have viewed as wrong-headed about the Bay Colony homicide laws. Did
these laws not conform to scripture? Were they impermissibly tainted by
common law language? Did not section five of the Massachusetts law pose
a distinction without a difference? These are not readily answered ques-
tions. But since the Connecticut statute was thus a self-conscious rejoinder
to the Massachusetts law, as the latter was itself, in the first instance, a
response to contemporary English legal practices, it is best for us to seek an
answer to these questions by asking another: What do we know of the rea-
sons behind the drafting of sections four and five of the Liberties? Here, the
primary sources more readily support our inquiry.
The language of section five of the Liberties contains a peculiar turn of
phrase. "Crueltie of passion" looks very much like "heat" or "furie" or any
of the other phraseology that Elizabethan treatise writers had employed to
describe the "hot blood" of manslaughter.15 The word "suddaienly" was, in
12. The 1642 Connecticut statute is found at I CONN. RECS. 77 (J. Trumbull ed.)
(Hartford 1852).
It is conceivable that they dropped the provision because its citations did not conform to
scripture-originally given as Numbers 25:20-21 instead of 35:20-21-but the Connecticut
Code of 1650 also failed to enact a correctly cited form of the Massachusetts law which ap-
peared in the LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF 1648. The remaining citation, Leviticus 24:17, merely
reiterated the illegality of killing a man. Taken together, the passages still do not deal with
sudden anger but killing by smiting in enmity or by lying in wait.
13. BODY OF LIBERTIES OF 1641, Art. 94, § 5 & § 4, reprinted in, COLONIAL LAWS OF
MASSACHUSETTS 32-61 (W. Whitmore ed. 1890).
14. W. Holdsworth, Law and Society in Colonial Connecticut, 1636-1692, at 385 (un-
published Ph.D. thesis, Claremont Grad. Sch. 1974, in Connecticut Historical Society, Hart-
ford, Conn.)
15. W. LAMBARDE, EIRENARCHA, OR OF THE OFFICE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE
252 (London ed. 1602); M. Dalton, THE COUNTRY JUSTICE 223 (London ed. 1619); E. COKE,
THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 54-55 (London 1809) (1st
[Vol. 21
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truth, the touchstone of the entire doctrine. 6 Manslaughter was thought of
as a sudden, essentially unlooked for encounter, in which a heated quarrel
gave rise to an intentional killing. On the other hand, "suddenly," as that
term is employed in scriptural discussion of homicide, describes but an acci-
dental killing without intent or passion of any sort."7 The Mosaical Law
ed. 1644). "Some manslaughters be voluntary, and not of malice forethought, upon some sud-
den falling out . .. [a]nd this for distinction sake is called manslaughter." Id.
16. Common law manslaughter originally arose in the sixteenth century as a response to
statutory strictures placed upon what up to then was the rather free availability of the plea of
benefit of clergy in cases of murder. Thus, clergy could no longer be interposed in cases where
the facts alleged and proved involved a deliberate or premeditated killing. 3 J. STEPHEN, HIs-
TORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 44 (1883), and statutes cited therein. On statutes
regulating benefit of clergy, see J. BELLAMY, in Benefit of Clergy in the Fifteenth and Six-
teenth Centuries, CRIMINAL LAW AND SOCIETY IN LATE MEDIEVAL AND TUDOR ENGLAND,
130 (1984). Concurrently, the notion of "chance medley" as an accidental killing not alto-
gether without the killer's fault and without an evil intent was altered to encompass sudden,
unpremeditated but still intentional killings. The doctrine which accounted for this new dis-
tinction between murder and whatever was left of culpable homicide was that of "hot" and
"cold" blood. Kaye, The Early History of Murder and Manslaughter, 83 L.Q. REV. 365, 589-
90 (1967). Lambarde, a sixteenth century treatise writer, called it "furie, which was (at first)
without malice and could not in so short time be appeased." W. LAMBARDE, supra note 15, at
252. Lest the hot blood be identified with the supposed cold blood of malice aforethought
(malice prepence), it had to have arisen from a spontaneous quarrel, thereby, it was thought,
preventing premeditation. Hence, the statement by Lord Coke that "There is no difference
between murder and manslaughter, but that the one is upon malice forethought and the other
upon a sudden occasion, and therefore is called chance medley." E. COKE, supra note 15, at
55. The crime of manslaughter remained clergyable. 3 J. STEPHEN, supra, at 59-60, J. BAKER,
supra note 5, at 429. In practice, however, this distinction was inexact and cumbersome, and it
gradually fell out of use. J. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 285 (1st
ed. 1971); see infra note 129.
17. Numbers 35:22,24: "But if he thrust [push] him suddenly without enmity ...
[t]hen the congregation shall judge between the slayer and the revenger of blood according to
these judgments .. " There is little doubt of a misreading. The Puritan GENEVA BIBLE
(1560) (London ed. 1592), for example, translates this passage thus: "But if he punished him
unadvisedly, & not of hatred .. " In the margin, the gloss "suddenly" appears as the He-
brew for "unadvisedly," thus making it clear that the act was understood as essentially unin-
tentional. Therefore, according to scripture, one either "thrust" another of hatred, or "sud-
denly" without hatred. See, e.g., J. GREENSTONE, THE HOLY SCRIPTURES: NUMBERS WITH
COMMENTARY 358 (Jewish Pub. Soc'y. of Am. 1939). That the common law allowed for addi-
tional categories of homicide was well understood by contemporary lawyers of any learning.
Francis Bacon, Attorney-General, in an argument before Star Chamber in 1614 stated that
"for the law of God, there is never to be found any difference made in homicide, but between
homicide voluntary and involuntary, which we term misadventure . . .It is true that our law
hath made a more subtle distinction between the will inflamed and the will advised; between
manslaughter in heat, and murder upon prepensed malice, or cold blood, as the soldiers call
it .. " F. BACON, Charge Touching Duels, in 2 WORKS OF LORD BACON 297 (B. Montagu
ed. Philadelphia 1841). This distinction is still not appreciated: "The Bay Colony code instead
employed the biblical death penalty for killing in the heat of passion." P. HOFFER & N. HULL,
MURDERING MOTHERS: INFANTICIDE IN ENGLAND AND NEW ENGLAND 1558-1803, at 37
(1981). Scripture does not admit of the common-law distinction. 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA,
s.v. Homicide, at 944 (1971). Only the later Talmudic Law began to make those distinctions
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accorded a city of refuge (exile) for the man guilty of such negligence, and
it prescribed no additional penalty. 8 Clearly, no part of section five, in spite
of the biblical citations appended to it, had any literal foundation in scrip-
ture. In this respect, the section was unlike all the other sections of Article
Ninety-four.
The conclusion is inescapable that by excising and reassembling bibli-
cal phrases, the Massachusetts drafters of the Liberties had in fact sought
to reject outright this aspect of the English common and statute law. This
determination is hinted at in the answer of the Bay Colony's Reverend El-
ders to certain questions propounded to them by the magistrates in 1644.
The Elders cited Numb.35:16-18 and 20-21 for their reading of the colony's
capital crime for killing "upon prepenced malice" and that "upon sudden
provocation," even though they recognized that the former was "of a
greater guilt" than the latter.19 The Elders cast their response in patently
common law terms. More than this, Numb. 35:20-21 could not possibly
support their position that the Lord's Word offered any sort of justification
for their interpretation, because according to the cited passage, he who
"thrusts him suddenly" should not die. The reason for this biblical conclu-
sion was clear: the act was unintentional ("without enmity"). So unmistak-
able is the scriptural language, that it cannot even be assumed that the
Elders took it as a "warrant," or justification by deduction, for their posi-
tion. Thus, there is little doubt that the Elders knew well the difference
between murder and manslaughter, and that they chose for some reason to
act as if both crimes were equally proscribed by scripture. Other than this
particular reply to the magistrates, however, there is no direct evidence to
show why the Elders thought that manslaughter should invariably merit the
same punishment as murder.
An explicit statement of the Puritan view on the subject of manslaugh-
ter can be found, however, in a contemporary English tract reporting the
activities of the Nominated Parliament.? A Committee for Regulating the
between premeditated and unpremeditated homicide with which Anglo-American law is famil-
iar. Id. at 945. But see M. SULZBERGER, THE ANCIENT HEBREW LAW OF HOMICIDE 40, 63 &
86 (1915).
18. Exodus 21:13: "And if a man lie not in wait, but God deliver him into his hand; then
I will appoint thee a place whither he shall flee." Since the killing was unwilled by man in this
circumstance, it was ascribed to the will of God. Exodus, in CAMBRIDGE BIBLE COMMENTARY,
134 (R. Clements commentator 1972); M. SULZBERGER, supra note 17, at 39-40.
19. The Elders responded that:
Certaine penalties may and ought to be prescribed to capitall crimes, although they
may admitt variable degrees of guilt, as in case of murder upon prepensed malice and
upon sudden provocation there is prescribed the same death in both, though murder upon
a prepensed malice be a farre greater guilt then upon sudden provocation.
COLLECTION, supra note 3, at 183, 1 PUBLICATIONS OF THE PRINCE SOCIETY 209, 2 J. WIN-
THROP, JOURNAL, History of New England 252-53 (J. Savage ed.) (Boston 1853).
20. L.D., AN EXACT RELATION OF THE PROCEEDINGS & TRANSACTIONS OF THE LATE
[Vol. 21
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Laws had been appointed to prepare a bill for a "new body or Modell of the
Law," essentially, a thorough revision of statute, common and customary
law. The committee's report on the criminal law of England found that
both "right reason" and the "Law of God" were contrary to "the putting
men to death for Theft, The sparing the lives of men for Murther, under
the notion and name of Manslaughter, a term and distinction not found in
the righteous Law of God. .... ,,' The committee may even have made this
statement in light of the Massachusetts legislation.2 2
In any event, whether specific scriptural authority could be cited or
not, the Bay Colony Puritans and their reformist counterparts in England
recognized the common law doctrine of manslaughter as illogical, often un-
fair 23, and unsanctioned by God, for the crime still involved a "wilfull" kill-
ing. How clearly this view lay athwart common-law doctrine is seen in the
fact that when Puritan Massachusetts fell under both a royal charter and
governor later in the seventeenth century, the Privy Council in London took
the opportunity to pass upon this and the other capital laws of the colony.
The Council formally rejected six of the capital laws as repugnant to the
laws of England, one being the killing in sudden anger provision.14 Predict-
PARLIAMENT (London 1654) (Beinecke Library, Yale Univ.), 2 SOMERS TRACTS 82-101
(London 1751). The author notes that the chief reasons for calling for a new body of law were
"the Intricacy, Uncertainty, and Incongruity in many Things with the Word of God and right
Reason, in the Laws as now they are." Id. at 15, 2 SOMERS TRACTS at 92.
21. Id. at 17, 2 SOMERS TRACTS at 93.
22. The tract says of the Committee's report:
A work great, and high and great esteem with many, for the great fruit and benefit
that would come by it: By which means the great volumes of Law would come to be
reduced into the bigness of a pocket book, as it is proportionable in New England and
elsewhere: A thing of so great worth and benefit as England is not yet worthy of, nor
likely in a short time to be so blessed as to injoy [sic] ...
Id. at 17-18, 2 SOMERS TRACTS at 94. See S. E. PRALL, THE AGITATION FOR LAW REFORM
DURING THE PURITAN REVOLUTION, 1640-1660, passim (1966).
23. E.g., C.G. COCKE, ENGLISH LAW: OR A SUMMARY SURVEY OF THE HOUSEHOLD OF
GOD ON EARTH, AND THAT BOTH BEFORE AND UNDER THE LAW; AND THAT BOTH OF MOSES
AND THE LORD JESUS 77 (London 1651) (Beinecke Library, Yale Univ.) Cocke's diatribe on
the present fallen state of English law contains the following description of benefit of clergy,
by which one convicted of manslaughter might escape the noose: "[Some judges] go against
their own knowledge in the Law; as in the case of admitting such to read as they know cannot,
and more evidently such as are not capable by Law, as those branded before, not once, but
seven times, whereby the Rogue is as preserved, so encouraged .. " Id. at 89. Cocke is
referring to the practice of branding in the thumb, thereby indicating that the individual had
already had his once-bestowed clergy. The author concluded that "it is evident, that the Eng-
lish now long and thirst after a rational settled Law in all the parts of the whole body, taking
the Law of God for the Rule," id., and proposed that a Committee undertake the task, thus
foreshadowing the work of the Committee for Regulating the Laws.
24. E. POWERS, supra note 2, at 304-305. The other capital laws rejected were: idolatry,
witchcraft, blasphemy, poisoning and incest. P. MILLER, THE NEW ENGLAND MIND, FROM
COLONY TO PROVINCE 168 (1953), notes that in the years after the Dominion of New England
had displaced Massachusetts's original charter government (i.e. from 1689 onwards) two
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ably, the Council pointed to the fact that killing "upon sudden heat" was
not in all cases a hanging offense in England.15
The Connecticut drafters of the 1642 statute, thoroughly uncon-
strained by the repugnancy clauses of contemporary royal charters, may not
have felt the need to justify the removal of manslaughter from the homicide
law; strictly viewed, scripture forbade its incorporation.2 6 Something of the
same attitude may have accounted for the second deletion made to the mur-
der provision of Article Ninety-four. Expunging the word "premeditated"
from the definition of murder thereby destroyed what remained of the com-
mon-law distinction between "malice aforethought" and killings "on the
sudden" or "upon sudden provocation. ' 7 The resulting definition, though
still cast in common-law terminology, was an injunction against killing
much more in accord with the Lex Mosis.2 An attitude similar to that of
the Connecticut drafters had, after all, already surfaced in the Rev. John
Cotton's proposed code for Massachusetts Bay (1638). Cotton's proposal,
an example of rigorous biblical literalism in legal drafting, defines murder
as "a willful manslaughter, not in a mans necessary defence, nor casually
committed, but out of hatred or cruelty, to be punished with death. 29 Cot-
ton's draft also has no provision akin to section five of the subsequently
"heavy obligations" were laid upon New England thought: (I) the incorporation into its social
theory of loyalty to the Crown; and (2) accommodation to the idea of toleration (i.e. reference
to the Act of Toleration, I William & Mary ch. 18 (1689)). Men like Increase Mather thus
were compelled to set themselves the task of reconciling the notion of "a city upon a hill" to
this new reality, in order to salvage what they could of self-government for their colonies. The
attempt to re-enact the old capital laws was an essential part of the program, but the Privy
Council was not fooled, particularly by the Bay Colony's attempt to skirt the issue of religious
toleration. Miller writes: "The Matherian scheme suffered a serious setback when the Crown
disallowed the capital punishment act (London was astute enough to appreciate that under the
heading of subversive idolatry and blasphemy Quakers or even good Anglicans might find
themselves, in the provincial sense of the terms, guilty.)" Id. at 174-75. Miller comments that
Connecticut had less trouble then Massachusetts in carrying over the covenant idea intact and
"moving with it into the eighteenth century." Id. at 177.
25. E. POWERS, supra note 2, at 305.
26. For the repugnancy clauses, see Charter of Massachusetts Bay (1629) in 3 F.N.
THORPE, supra note 8, at 1853 ("And to make Lawes and Ordinnces ... soce as such Lawes
and Ordinances by not contrarie or repugnant to the Lawes and Statuts of this our Realme of
England.") Similar language is to be found in the later (1662) Connecticut charter. See id. at
533.
Besides murder, the Lex Mosis recognizes only accidental homicide and justifiable homi-
cide (self-defence). It is not the case, as Hoffer and Hull assert, that Connecticut "removed
killing in the heat of anger from the list of capital offenses. ... P. HOFFER & N. HULL,
supra note 17, at 37. The colony had never enacted such a law, either in 1642 or in the code of
1650.
27. See supra note 16.
28. G. HASKINS, supra note 2, at 148-49.
29. COLLECTION, supra note 3, at 174, 1 PUBLICATIONS OF THE PRINCE SOCIETY at 198-
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adopted Massachusetts Liberties of 1641. Interesting too is the correct as-
signation of verses from chapter thirty-five of Numbers to the murder pro-
vision: verses twenty-one to twenty-four, those prescribing exile for the acci-
dental killer, thus justify the language "nor casually committed." The Bay
Colony never adopted this code, but the Connecticut men who drew up the
1642 statute may have consulted a copy of it with approval.30
Thus, in respect to the use of biblical warrants for their capital laws,
the Connecticut drafters of 1642 achieved a greater fidelity to scripture
than either Massachusetts or New Haven. Holdsworth values this result as
a clarification of the uneasy relation between the common and biblical law,
and as a response to little differentiation in the Bible between murder and
manslaughter. Just so, but rather than the "practical and simple solution"
to the confusion, as he sees it, the thrust of the Connecticut enactment is
probably better viewed as the triumph of a parochialism which swept aside
the attempts of the Massachusetts drafters to accomplish the same end by
contrived and explicit negation. There is no need to view the embrace of the
Pentateuchal law as either practical or simple; to do so is to undervalue the
perceived need to make the change and the power of the choice made. No
matter of practical necessity, we can rest assured, dictated that the first
formal legal act of the General Court had to take the form of a litany of
great crimes, but viewing these same crimes also as great sins makes their
early promulgation comprehensible. Holdsworth's assertion that the Con-
necticut definition of homicide enlarged the discretion of the courts is
sound, but not at this early stage in the settlement's history. The circum-
stances of the settlement's founding and her relations with Massachusetts,
the mother colony, suggest, insofar as we have evidence to support it, at
least an early aversion to the encroachments of magisterial discretion.3 1 We
must not disable the 1642 murder statute with hindsight. Nothing, either in
30. It was available to the new Haven settlement's leader, the Rev. John Davenport,
shortly after his group's arrival there in 1638. Calder, John Cotton and the New Haven Col-
ony, 3 NEw ENG. Q. 82-94 (1930); R. OSTERwEis, THREE CENTURIES OF NEW HAVEN, 1638-
1938, 17-18 (1953).
31. In a letter dated 1638 to Gov. Winthrop of Massachusetts, the Rev. Thomas
Hooker, founder of the Connecticut settlement, stated that:
in the matter which is referred to the judge, the sentence should lie in his breast, or
be left to his discretion, according to which he should go, I am afraid it is a course which
wants both safety and warrant. I must confess, I ever looked at it as a way which leads
directly to tyranny, and so to confusion, and must plainly profess, if it was in my liberty,
I should choose neither to live nor leave my posterity under such a government. Sit liber
judex, as the lawyers speak. 17 Deut. 10,1 -Thou shalt observe to do according to all
that they inform, according to the sentence of the Law. Thou shalt seek the Law at his
mouth: not ask what his discretion allows, but what the Law requires. . . .And we know
in other countries, had not the law overruled the lusts of men and the crooked ends of
judges, many times, both places and people had been, in reason, past all relief, in many
cases of difficulty. ...
I CONN. HISTORICAL SOCIETY COLLECTIONS 11-12 (Hartford 1860).
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the particular biblical definitions offered by this statute, or the Mosaical
Law itself, necessitates the kind of discretion on the part of the civil magis-
trate to which Holdsworth makes reference.
Eight years after the enactment of the Captiall Lawes, the General
Court promulgated the first full code of laws for Connecticut (1650). 8" The
old Capitall Lawes were transferred to the new statute in their entirety. A
new title, "Manslaughter," compiled elsewhere in the code, was borrowed
from the language of the Massachusetts Laws and Liberties of 1648.31 This
section read:
It is ordered by this Courte and Authority thereof, that if any
person in the just and necessary defence of his life, or the life of
any other, shall kill any person attempting to rob or murther in
the field or high way, or to breake into any dwelling house, if
hee conceive hee cannott with safety of his own person otherwise
take the Felon or Assailant, or bring him to tryall, hee shall be
holden blameless.8
4
The designation for this title meant but killing in general and not the spe-
cialized term at common law.3 5 What it actually described was homicide se
defendendo36 as it was then called (self-defence), and so it had been la-
belled in the Massachusetts code.
It is curious that the need was felt in either colony's code for additional
language in support for the two exceptions that already existed in the Cap-
tiall Lawes, corresponding to the traditional exception for accident (called
misadventure at common-law) and self-defence sanctioned by scripture.
Originally drafted for inclusion in the Laws and Liberties of 1648, this pro-
vision was undoubtedly the fruit of that General Court's request for English
lawbooks in 1647.37 In this, the 1650 draft conformed with several minor
32. 1 CONN. REcS. 138.
33. LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF 1648, at 37 (1648) (facsimile reprint 1929).
34. I CONN. RECS. 539. There is similar language in the justice manuals of the period.
See, M. DALTON, supra note 15, at 228-29, W. LAMBARDE, supra note 15, at 215. The Puri-
tans did not, however, enact the language from the justice manuals that permitted the taking
of a life in defence of one's property, this being without precedent in scripture.
35. BODY OF LIBERTIES, art. 94, § 4. An indictment from a 1667 Connecticut case reads,
for example, "thou has committed murther which is man slaughter by murdering thy
wife .. " 3 CONNECTICUT COLONIAL PROBATE RECORDS, COUNTY COURT 1663-1677, at
71, in CONNECTICUT STATE ARCHIVES; N. Lacy, Transcript of the Records of the Court of
Assistants, 1665-1701, at 7 (1937) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Yale University, in Connecticut
State Archives).
36. E. COKE, supra note 15, at 55.
37. The General Court sent off to London for copies of both Dalton's Countrey Justice
and Coke's works. 2 MASS. COL. RECS. 212. Governor Winthrop of Massachusetts was known
to possess a copy of W. LAMBARDE'S Eirenarcha, G. DALZELL, supra note 5, at 185, and Win.
Pynchon, Winthrop's contemporary and founder of Springfield, Mass., was familiar with both
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changes of common law origin made to the text of the Liberties. It clarified
the viability of certain English notions of self-defence (for example, the
sanctity of the home), but what is most telling is again what the Connecti-
cut draft omits. The provision makes no mention of defence of goods or
property as sufficient justification for the taking of the life of another. Un-
like any similar provisions found in the English lawbooks, this provision
insists that the endangered party attempt to bring the attacker to trial. Pu-
ritan notions of justice would have recoiled at the suggestion of defence of
property as sufficient justification for the taking of a life. 8 So too would
they have considered the bringing of the villain to justice and the acknowl-
edgement of his sin to be almost as important as the right of the endan-
gered party to take strong measures for his own safety. Thus, the Puritans
borrowed freely from English law where it was not at variance with scrip-
ture, but their refusal to add these distinctions to the capital laws proper
underscores a reverence for the divine word which would not brook the
emendation of foundational concepts: material drawn from outside scripture
had to be compiled elsewhere.
No acts were passed after 1650 which bear upon the issue of homicide.
The revisors of the 1672 Connecticut code of laws did delete the phrase
"wCH is manslaughter" from the murder statute. This emendation occa-
sioned no change in the effect of the law. The drafters may have been con-
cerned that the term "manslaughter," increasingly employed in the seven-
teenth century to describe a particular crime under English law, confuse the
meaning of the provision (although the self-defence provision continued for
decades to retain the word in its more antique usage).
More generally, the closing years of the seventeenth century did see a
significant increase in a number of enactments in other areas of the law
which tended to bring colonial ways into closer conformity with the legal
customs of the mother country.39 In the face of these developments, the
capital laws remained scriptural. The colony grew and with it the incidence
of serious crime and the frequency and formality of criminal proceedings.
But there was no rush to redesign the penal code.4 0 In England, the re-
Dalton's work and Fortesque's On the Laws of England. COLONIAL JUSTICE IN WESTERN
MASSACHUSETTS, 1639-1702, at 157 (J. Smith ed. 1961).
38. Cf. infra note 43.
39. 3 N. OSBORN, supra note 8, at 53. The royal governorship of Sir Edmund Andros,
briefly imposed in the late 1680's, also heightened the pressure upon Connecticut to conform
its laws to those of England. Reinsch traces the colonial assertion of certain English rights like
that of habeas corpus to this period. I SELECT ESSAYS, supra note 2, at 384.
40. R. BUSHMAN, FROM PURITAN TO YANKEE 189-90 (1967). Actually, any dispropor-
tion in the number of criminal laws was probably as great as at the establishment of the
settlement, at which time, as I have argued, the Capitall Lawes appeared more severe and
numerous than the needs of the people might have warranted.
Connecticut did incorporate two new capital offenses in the 1672 code. The incest provi-
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sponse to changing social conditions was the swelling of capital crimes to
over some two hundred by 1702.41 In Connecticut, legislative efforts at-
tempted to eradicate criminal behavior more by the pervasive encourage-
ment of godly living in day-to-day matters than by fear of greater punish-
ment."2 Such a response was consistent with a view that true law and the
outlines for the shaping of the righteous community were to be found in the
Book: the capital crimes could not be enlarged without express authority in
scripture.4 3
sion was definitely in response to the word of scripture, for the General Court so passed upon
the question of its punishment in an advisory opinion in 1665. (It was dropped from the 1702
revision of the statutes.) This crime was never capital in Massachusetts, although the Cotton
draft had made it so. Cotton Code Ch. 7.19, in COLLECTION, supra note 3, at 175, I PUBLICA-
TIONS OF THE PRINCE SOCIETY 199. In England, Blackstone states that incest was made capi-
tal (along with adultery) during the Interregnum, but non-capital again at the beginning of the
Restoration and relegated to the ecclesiastical courts. 4 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *64.
The rape statute, unlike its Bay Colony counterpart and English law, contained no age of
consent. Id. at *212, G. HASKINS, supra note 2, at 150-52, detailing the history of the various
Massachusetts laws leading up to the enactment of 1648. This law was mitigated somewhat by
its calling for conviction only upon speedy prosecution and complaint, evocative of the earliest
English law on the subject, 4 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES at *211-212, but not in accord
with the contemporary practice which made the crime a felony and non-clergyable. Id.
41. 1 N. OSBORN, supra note 8, at 430. By the end of the seventeenth century, the
following crimes were excluded from benefit of clergy in England: (i) high treason (always
so); (2) petty treason; (3) murder; (4) arson; (5) burglary; (6) housebreaking and putting in
fear; (7) highway robbery; (8) horse stealing; (9) stealing from a person anything above the
value of a shilling; (10) rape and abduction with intent to marry. I J. STEPHEN, supra note 16,
at 467. Worse was to come. For one view of the legislative mindset, see E. THOMPSON, WHIGS
AND HUNTERS (1975) (contextual study of the "Black Act" of 1723).
42. R. BUSHMAN, supra note 40, at 6. Bushman claims that opportunities for private
gain vastly increased after 1690 with the expansion of markets for farmers and merchants
alike, and that this economic boom "precipitated clashes" with religion, law and authority, as
the internal cohesiveness of a society in which obedience to its laws and magistrates was a
reflection of God's eternal dispensation for the faithful disintegrated in the face of the head-
long pursuit of prosperity. It was in this state of affairs that the Great Awakening flourished in
the first half of the eighteenth century. Id. at 183-87 & 193-94.
43. The two acts imposing the death penalty which were exclusively of English origin
appeared in the 1702 Connecticut code, but these provisions were excluded from the list of
capital laws, following in separate sections (like the self-defence provision). One, an Act
Against High Treason, was undoubtedly a direct response to political pressures, chiefly from
the Board of Trade in London to submit laws for review. The law is nearly verbatim rendering
of Massachusetts legislation from the ACTS AND LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY (1699). See
generally C. ANDREWS, FANE's REPORTS ON THE LAWS OF CONNECTICUT (1915). The other
statute, an Act to Prevent the Destroying and Murthering of Bastard Children, first enacted in
1699 and patterned after Massachusetts legislation of 1696, was a response to a recent case in
the Connecticut village of Farmington. CONNECTICUT COLONIAL RECORDS, NEW ENGLAND
1659-1701, at 92-93, N. LACY, supra note 35, at 290-92, CONNECTICUT STATE ARCHIVES, I
Crimes and Misdemeanors 219-23 [hereinafter C & MI, 4 CONN. RECS. 285. Since the Mas-
sachusetts act is a literal version of a Jacobean statute, 21 Jac.l, ch. 27, this is the first in-
stance of Connecticut's directly enacting English criminal legislation (although the English
statute is not cited). Hoffer and Hull correctly note that infanticide is just as well a biblical
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B.
This substantive as opposed to predominately didactic function of
scripture in Connecticut's criminal law is better understood when compared
to the contemporary statutory framework of a sister colony. There, Puritan
orthodoxy did not constrain the settlers to limit their legal authorities in the
same manner; on the contrary, their heterodoxy probably had the opposite
effect. Rhode Island in fact owed its existence to Roger Williams' banish-
ment (1636) and that of other dissenters from Massachusetts for religious
intransigence and sedition. Rhode Island's Acts and Orders of 1647,' be-
sides guaranteeing all the protection of "some known law, and according to
the letter of it," 4 5 proclaimed its resolve to make laws "conformable to the
laws of England so far as the nature and constitution of our place will ad-
mit."'4 6 In contrast, the Epistle4 7 to the Connecticut code of 1672 proceeded
to limit the effect of English law to its "understanding" of that law,"" and
reiterated its chief goal of ensuring that "pure Religion . ..according to
crime, but they also assert that the use of the Jacobean statue is thus evidence of the fact that
"the codemakers of New England did not mention the crime of infanticide for they never
derived their notions of homicide from holy scripture." P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supra note 17,
at 37. No puritan settlement enacted all of the judicial law of Moses, but by the beginning of
the eighteenth century it is conceded that they would have preferred the English statute to the
unelaborated scripture. The authors do suggest at a another point in their analysis that the
adoption of the English statute occurred at a time when Puritan courts were becoming increas-
ingly Anglicized and when the statute's chief virtue was clarity and a formalized restatement
of Puritan views on criminality. Id. at 59. Moreover, the fact that infanticide was not outlawed
earlier hardly proves a nonreliance upon scripture, for the evidence surrounding the eventual
enactment of laws against adultery, rape and incest all agree that the Word provided justifica-
tion and not the common and statute law.
44. I RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF RHODE ISLAND 156 (J. Bartlett ed. Providence
1856); EARLIEST ACTS AND LAWS OF THE COLONY OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE
PLANTATIONS 1647-1719, at 3-57 (J. Cushing ed. 1977).
45. ACTS AND ORDERS OF 1647, Touching Laws, 1.
46. id. at 4.
47. The early codes all contained an introductory epistle or letter, explaining the prove-
nance of the laws and the polity which promulgated them. The intended audience was proba-
bly the king and his ministers and not the people at whom the laws were directed. The Con-
necticut Epistle in the code of 1672 was the work of John Allyn, Secretary of the General
Court. The letter is declarative of the purposes of the ensuing particular legislation and is
modelled on a similar epistle or preface to the Massachusetts LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF 1648.
The epistles purported to settle the question of the order of precedence of the rival scriptural
and common law. The Massachusetts epistle, drafted two years after the irksome Child Re-
monstrance, supra note 3, instructed that all of the law for the settlement was derived from
that body of laws given by God to the Israelites. See infra note 83. The primacy of the law of
God as manifested in the law of Moses is also clearly stated in the epistle to the Code of 1658
of Plymouth Colony. See infra note 82. Indeed, the Bay Colony epistle intoned that the "dis-
tinction which is put between the Lawes of God and the lawes of man, becomes a snare to
many as it is mis-applyed on the ordering of their obedience to civil Authorities. See
Morris, supra note 3, at 453 note 68.
48. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
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the Gospel of Our Lord Jesus may be maintained amongst us, which was
the end of the first Planters . . . and ought to be the endeavours of those
that shall succeed to Uphold and Encourage unto all Generations." The
Rhode Island codifiers merely paraphrased St. Paul (the "Doctor of the
Gentiles"): "that the law is made or brought to light . . . for the lawless
and disobedient" and concluded without more that "upon the point, may be
reduced the common law of the realm of England, the end of which is...
to preserve every man safe in his own person, name and estate. . .. ""
The contrasting position on the source of law mirrored the disagree-
ments that Williams had had with the Bay Colony (and, ex hypothesi,
would have had with Connecticut as well). Williams' difficulties in Massa-
chusetts stemmed as much from his views on secular authority as from his
Separatist leanings within the Church. His conviction that worldly experi-
ence partook of both a spiritual as well as natural dimension had led him to
question the Puritan assumption-fully operational in Massachusetts-that
the institutions of Church and State were subsumed in the unique calling of
the civil magistrate or ruler in a Christian polity to promote both order and
religious purity. Williams called for a separation of Church and State
whereby the civil magistrate was given leave to function only within the
natural world: to the Church was left spiritual concerns without the means
of temporal enforcement."'
49. ACTS AND ORDERS OF 1647, Touching the Common Law.
50. Mosaicism found no ally in Williams. On the contrary, he explicitly denied the value
or binding nature of Mosaic precedents. He asserted that the Old Testament dispensation
under the laws of Moses had been forever displaced by that of Christ; that He had appointed
"spiritual remedies" for "spiritual maladies" and never had indicated any need of the sword to
achieve the salvation of the world. R. WILLIAMS, The Bloody Tenent yet more Bloody (1652),
in 4 COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 185-86 (1872) (reprint 1963). Israel's laws
were time-bound and of limited religious or even allegorical import: "To make the shadowes of
the old Testament and the Substance or Body of the New, all one, is but to confound and
mingle Heaven and Earth together, for the state of the Law was ceremoniall and figurative,
having a worldly Tabernacle with vanishing and beggarly Rudiments. Id. at 450 (em-
phasis in original).
Williams penned both this tract and a previous one, The Bloody Tenent, Of Persecution,
For the Clause of Conscience (1644), while in England where he hoped to procure recognition
for his new settlement from Parliament. Meanwhile, aware of the potentially adverse impact of
Williams' writings on its relations with the as yet unstable home government in England, the
Massachusetts colony set the Rev. John Cotton to the task of refuting Williams' claims. Cot-
ton's rebuttal, entitled The Bloody Tenet, Washed, and Made White in the Blood of the
Lambe (London 1647) (Beinecke Library, Yale Univ.), deliberately took up the question of the
civil magistrate's duty to safeguard religious purity and, inter alia, declared that the judicial
law of Moses, such as was of "moral equity" (infra) was binding upon the government of men.
Id. at 55. According to Cotton,
It is evident the civill sword was appointed for a remedy. . . by that Angell of Gods
presence. . . And that Angell was Christ. . . And therefore it cannot truly be said, that
the Lord Jesus never appointed the civill sword for a remedy in such a case. For he did
expressely appoint it in the Old-Testament; nor did he ever abrogate it in the New. The
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Here we see clearly the theo-political import of the Bay Colony and
Connecticut Capitall Lawes. For these Puritan communities the Lawes
stated first principles of social control; they were directed with equal and
undifferentiated vigor at heresy and social disorder; indeed, the one was
synonymous with the other. For men like Williams and his fellow settlers in
Rhode Island, the very insistence on separation of the State from the
Church, whether narrowly grounded on Separatist doctrine or more widely
conceived as a unifying element in a heterodox climate51 , led naturally to
the abolition of sanctions for purely religious offenses as well as the free
importation of more secular legal language and principles. For this latter
purpose the common and statute law of England was largely
unobjectionable.5 2
In consequence, the capital laws of Rhode Island follow the English
pattern set forth in any of the justice manuals (that is, in descending order
of seriousness, of high treason, petit treason, rebellion and so forth), citing
reason of the Law, (which is the life of the Law) is of eternell force and equity in all
Ages.
Id. at 67 (emphasis in original). Because Christ "expressly authorized civil magistracy in the
New Testament", and "has given no express laws or rules of righteousness ... in the adminis-
tration of civil justice," Cotton concluded that "either He leaves them to act and rule without
a rule (which derogates from the perfection of Scripture), or else they must fetch their rules of
righteousness from the law of Moses .. " Id. at 177-78.
In respect to the specific issue of capital offenses, Cotton countered that the civil magis-
trate had jurisdiction over heinous religious as well as secular crimes, citing St. Paul's appeal
to Caesar's judgment seat for alleged wrongs of both a civil and religious nature. Id. at 58
citing Acts 25:10. From this scriptural authority, Cotton deduced four principles, the first be-
ing, "That a man may be such an offender in matters of Religion (against the Law of God,
against the Church, as well as in civill matters against Caesar as to be worthy of death," and
the fourth being, "That the civill Magistrate ... may and ought to be so well acquainted, not
onely with civill causes, but also with causes of Religion, especially such as concerne life, as to
be able to judge, though not of all questions, yet of capitall offences, against Religion, as well
as against the civill State." Id. at 50 (emphasis in original).
51. Warden, The Rhode Island Civil Code of 1647, in SAINTs AND REVOLUTIONARIES
138, 141-42 (G. Hall ed. 1984).
52. Warden argues that the Rhode Island code gives but the appearance of conformity
to English law, and that any appeal to that law had as its motive unity/consensus among the
constituent towns, and the avoidance of criticism and scrutiny by both Parliament (cf. the
Child Remonstrance in Massachusetts) and Rhode Island's more powerful neighbors. Id. at
145. Nevertheless, Warden concedes that the Rhode Island code avoids biblical citations as
justification for its specific provisions. Id. at 148. His argument that the illogical arrangement
of crimes in the code owes its origin to the order of the second table sins of the Decalogue, id.
at 149, cannot be used profitably to claim that the code incorporates as much biblical sub-
stance as the Massachusetts, Connecticut and New Haven documents. Not coincidentally, the
Rhode Island code included only those crimes capital by both the law of England and scrip-
ture, thereby implying that the issue of conformity was less "superficial" than Warden sug-
gests. See Murrin, Trial by Jury in Seventeenth-Century New England, in SAINTS & REVO-
LUTIONARIES, supra note 51, at 167.
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English statutes and English treatise writers.53 In a section entitled "Touch-
ing Murdering Of Fathers and Mothers," the code acknowledges the "wis-
dom of the State of England, under whose command we are. . .-54 The
list of homicides and statutory citations are substantially those of Michael
Dalton, a treatise writer whose manual for justices of the peace was popular
at the time. This section speaks of those homicides "tolerated by the laws of
England," that is, the necessary execution of justice and self-defence.55 So
too does this Rhode Island statute, unlike both the Connecticut and Massa-
chusetts codes, contain an express misadventure provision, citing more Eng-
lish statutes and the law of forfeitures. Under a heading elsewhere entitled
"Casual Death," non-human agents of death (animals, falling limbs of trees
and the like) are to be prized "as the deodands are in England, and given to
the overseers for the use of the poor.""
Manslaughter was specifically provided for in the Rhode Island code,
correctly defined in all of its details by "divers laws of England," and by
further references to Dalton.5 7 This section confusingly heaps together man-
slaughter proper, excusable and justifiable homicide, and that done by
lunatics. It does not attach a penalty, but it is safe to assume that the bene-
fit of clergy was intended to operate in the jurisdiction, for the Murder
provision employs the language "felony of death, without remedy," the only
remedy at common-law being the grant of clergy. Likewise, this Man-
slaughter provision does provide for forfeiture, another aspect of the English
doctrine: "and yet his goods and chattels are to the king's custom."5
By 1664, the Rhode Island Act for Punishing Criminal Offenses had
laid down the entire English law, along with the benefit of clergy:
That whosoever shall be Convicted of High Treason, Petit Trea-
53. E.g., C. ST. GERMAIN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT (lst Eng. ed. 1530). Warden, supra
note 51, at 144, notes that some of the statutory citations in the Rhode Island code may date
from later than 1647, and that these marginalia were unwittingly printed at the end of each
paragraph in the original text in the nineteenth century. Conceded; but there are enough cita-
tions embedded in the actual text of each paragraph in order to validate the point which I am
presently making.
54. Connecticut never made such an acknowledgement. As an example of Rhode Is-
land's approach to legal authority, in a section entitled "Touching Whoremongers" (sodomy),
the 1647 code cites Romans 1:27 for justification, but adds: "[tlhe penalty concluded by that
state under whose authority were are is felony death without remedy [i.e. without clergy],"
thus firmly grounding the offense and the penalty therefor in the common and statute law of
England.
55. ACTS AND ORDERS, supra note 45, s.v. Manslaughter.
56. The law of deodands is laid out in all the justice manuals and treaties. E.g., E.
COKE, supra note 15, at 57-58. Connecticut never formally recognized these, but utilized the
language in the process of imitating the form of the English writs beginning in the eighteenth
century.
57. ACTS AND ORDERS, supra note 45, s.v. Manslaughter.
58. Id.
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son, Wilful Murder, or Manslaughter; shall be Punished for
such Offense, according to the Statute Laws of the Realm of
England, with Death; the Benefit of Clergy reserved where al-
lowable . ..
The contrast with Connecticut is patent. The Rhode Island statute makes
clear the fact that Connecticut's use of English law was limited only by the
conscious choice to narrow the cognizable sanctions and to exclude un-
wanted practices.
C.
This sense of encapsulation,60 of a largely unchanging subcode of seri-
ous crime or the great sins, raises the question of the exclusivity of these
provisions as a source of legal authority. Without doubt, though most En-
glishmen of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were steeped in biblical
learning, and the courts unexceptionally cited its language as some kind of
authority, it is still fair to say that English Puritans were more inclined
than others to embrace the language of scripture literally.6 Biblicism-the
notion that all secular laws should find their justification in the revelations
of scripture-was indeed a movement of considerable extent and vigor.62 In
Reformation England and especially during the early years of the seven-
teenth century, the law either directly or indirectly figured prominently in
the writings of the Puritan divines. Not infrequently, the urge to reform the
Church manifested itself in more wideranging proposals for the bringing of
society generally closer to God. The assumption of the magistrate as God's
officer followed naturally from the Puritan view that the ruler should main-
tain the true religion, even by force, and that the Church as well as the
59. RHODE ISLAND ACTS COLLECTED 4 (1719).
60. To be attributed to the fact that most of the capital laws were modelled upon the
Decalogue, that is, the moral law, which was immutable and not susceptible of selection as
were the so-called judicial laws which, comprising God's special revelation, were mutable ac-
cording to His Will. G. HASKINS, supra note 2, at 158-59. In a manuscript abstract prepared
by Cotton of a discussion of the Jewish law entitled "How Far Moses Judicialls Bind
Mass[achusetts]", it is stated that "The pRpet Lawes are I: the 10 Command. as delivRd on
M: Sinay . . . all these pRpet. Lawes bind vs." The manuscript is dated to sometime in 1636.
16 MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY PROCEEDINGS 280-84, 281 (2d series 1903). Cf., I
NEw HAVEN RECORDS, supra note 11, at 130 & 191 ("it was aggreed, concluded & setled as
a fundamentall law, not to bee disputed or questioned hereafter, that the judiciall lawes of
God, as they were delivered by Moses. . . shal be a constant direction for all proceedings here
& a gennerall rule in all courts of Justice how to judge betwixt partie and partie, & how to
punish offenders, till the same may be branched out into perticulars hereafter." (Feb. 24,
1644-45). In England, Cromwell appointed the Decalogue to be read each Sunday from all
pulpits in the country. Goebel, King's Law and Local Custom in Seventeenth Century New
England, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 416, 423 n.14 (1931).
61. G. HASKINS, supra note 2, at 141.
62. J. GOEBEL, supra note 60, at 423-25.
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State had a right to punish evildoers and heretics." For example, the de-
bates between Thomas Cartwright (d.1603), a Puritan professor of divinity
whose views led to both exile and imprisonment, and John Whitgift
(d.1604), head of the Prelatical party and Archbishop of Canterbury after
1583," did in fact touch upon the matter of capital laws. The Puritan insis-
tence upon the putting into place of the judicial laws of Moses alarmed
Whitgift, who reasoned that by this logic the pardoning power of the sover-
eign in such cases was endangered, the lawbooks must be abandoned, and
the clergy must be triumphant over the judiciary and the legal profession.
Cartwright, for his part, pressed the point that the magistrate was, as an
officer of God, disabled from abolishing or hedging about any of the Mosaic
laws, for these laws were perpetually binding; and that he must yield to the
Church upon any question respecting what was binding.65 Cartwright ar-
gued that lawbooks must be harmonized with the Pentateuchal Law. 66
Cartwright's particular arguments respecting capital crimes explain
why it was important to punish offenses against God so severely: these sins
of the first table of the Decalogue (idolatry, blasphemy, heresy) described a
state of society which could not but give rise to the sins of the second table
(murder, adultery, theft). Therefore, irreligion and unrighteousness had to
be rooted out; once they were, and the people were returned to God, the
social ills of the second table would wither away.67 It is not surprising then
to find that Connecticut's first statute was a set of capital laws embracing
most elements of the Decalogue. Adherence to Cartwright's position inevi-
tably led to the argument that the blasphemer was no more entitled to es-
cape death upon repentance than the murderer. 8
63. A.F. PEARSON, CHURCH & STATE: POLITICAL ASPECTS OF SIXTEENTH CENTURY PU-
RITANISM 105-107 (1928).
64. E. MOYER, WYCLIFFE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE CHURCH 78 & 432 (rev.
ed E. Cairns 1982). As Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge University in 1570, Whitgift was re-
sponsible for the dismissal of Cartwright from the latter's professorship on account of his vig-
orous support of the Puritan cause. Id.
65. 1 Works of John Whitgift 273 (1851-53), and Second Replie of Thomas Cartwright
95, 100-104, & 118 (1575), cited in A.F. Pearson, supra note 63, at 108.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 117-18. Consider, for example, the following, from a Massachusetts election
sermon delivered by Solomon Stoddard of Northampton in 1703: "Rulers are to be keepers of
both tables; and as they must practice Religion and Morality themselves, so they must take
care that the people do it; they must use all proper means, for the suppression of Heresy,
Prophaness & Superstition & other Corruptions in Worship." P. MILLER, supra note 24, at
176.
68. See also J. CO'TON, supra note 50, at 67. But the New England Puritans did not
apply the rigor of this logic. For example, in the case (1651) of John Clarke of Rhode Island
and two other Baptist companions, their visit to Massachusetts resulted in fines and the whip-
ping of one of them for espousing false doctrine. Before sentencing by the court, Cotton gave a
sermon affirming that "denying infants Baptism would overthrow all; & c. this was a capital
offence; and therefore they were foul-murtherers. ... Clarke continued: "When therefore
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The significance of the opposing views of men like Whitgift and Cart-
wright lay in the probability that if and when Puritanism gained a political
outlet, there would probably be a major reordering of affairs. This certainly
was true of the Puritan settlements in the New World where the ordering
of a society in covenant with God was a mission of the first order, In Eng-
land, pushed by Stuart policy to the breaking point, Puritanism entered the
political lists. During the Interregnum several Puritan tracts urged funda-
mental law reform, the chief plank in the platform being a return to Mosaic
Law and the abandonment or substantial revision of much of England's
tangled web of courts and laws." As previously mentioned, manslaughter
was specifically singled out by the Committee for the Regulation of the
Laws in 1653, as was the doctrine of deodands.7 0 Benefit of clergy generally
Governor M. John Indicot [John Endicott] came into the Court to pass Sentence against them,
he said thus, you deserve to dy, but this we agreed upon..." and imposed a choice of fines or
scourging. J. CLARK, ILL NEWES FROM NEw-ENGLAND: OR A NARATIVE 0 NEW-ENGLANDS
PERSECUTION 7, 26-27 (London 1652) (Beinecke Library, Yale Univ.).
From all that appears, obstinacy was the determinant of whether the full warrant of the
law would be imposed. "A civill Magistrate ought not to draw out his civill Sword against any
Seducers (Whether Hereticks, or Idolaters) till he have used all good meanes for their convic-
tion, and thereby clearely manifested the bowels of tender commiseration and compassion to-
wards them." COTTON, supra note 50, at 83. Of course, Cotton's tract was directed at the
question of how far the civill magistrate might go to enforce the First Table of the Decalogue;
testing for obstinacy was irrelevant in respect to social crimes. See text II.A. infra.
69. E.g., Hugh Peters, member of the law reform commission appointed by Parliament
in 1652, proposed the following:
For a Bodie of Laws, I know none but such as should bee the result of sound reason,
nor do I know anie such reason, nor do I know anie such reason, but what the God of
wisdom hath appointed. Therefore the Moral Law (that short Law called ten words) is
doubtless best; to which Moses's judicials added, with Solomon's Rules and experiments,
compleat. I wish our lawyers would urge these for Law; and not those obsolete presidents,
which will hardly prove . . . to fit our occasions.
H. PETERS, GOOD WORK FOR A GOOD MAGISTRATE, OR, A SHORT CUT TO GREAT QUIET. BY
HONEST, HOMELY PLAIN ENGLISH. HINTS GIVEN FROM SCRIPTURE, REASON, AND EXPERI-
ENCE, FOR THE REGULATING OF MOST CASES IN THIS COMMON-WEALTH 32 (London 1651),
quoted in S. PRALL, supra note 22, at 66. An anonymous tract from the year 1652 urged that:
But if the laws were few and short, and often read, it would prevent those Evils
[referring to criticism of the present common law]: As Moses laws in Israels common-
wealth: The people did talk of them when the lay down, and when they rose up, and as
they walked by the way; and bound them as bracelets upon their hands: so that they were
an understanding people in the laws wherein their peace did depend.
ARTICLES OF HIGH TREASON DRAWN UP IN THE NAME OF ALL THE COMMONS OF ENGLAND
AGAINST ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY JUDGES 4-5 (London 1652), quoted in S. PRALL, supra
note 22, at 70.
70. In a paraphrase of the Committee For The Regulation Of The Laws' report,
that unreasonable law, that if a waggon or cart &, driven by the owner, or some
other, with never so great care and endeavour, fall and kill any person, the owner, though
it were his own son or servant, could not way help it, shall lose his horse and waggon, by
the prophane and superstitious name of deodand. And the owners of the good shall loose
them also upon the same account, though they were as innocent as Abel. ...
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was set down for abolition.7 ' There was agitation to make theft not capital
and both adultery and blasphemy capital. 72 The English reform efforts
largely came to nothing, the work of the Committee for the Regulation of
the Laws nullified by the dissolution of Parliament in December, 1653.
Nevertheless, some considered the reform threat very real and Cromwell
himself, not altogether displeased with the vote to dissolve, is said to have
remarked that the body's work would have "subverted" the nation's laws
and liberties with the setting into place of the Mosaic Code. 73
It may therefore be asserted that Puritan Biblicist practice, which at-
tempted to abolish manslaughter and benefit of clergy in England, and
which favored the definition of murder as contained in the Judicial Law of
Moses, was substantially the same force behind the explicit outlawing of
manslaughter in Massachusetts and the implicit prohibition of the same in
Connecticut where the work of lawmakers involved not merely reform but
the enactment of a body of law to guide the New Israel in a newer wilder-
ness. The early Massachusetts codes and those of Connecticut were always
in agreement in this respect: that nowhere was God's Word to be more
exclusive than in the guaranteeing of purity of religion and the setting of
extreme penalties. Thus, the early government of the Bay Colony specifi-
cally legislated adultery capital in accordance with scriptural dictates.74
Similarly, at no time were lesser crimes like theft made capital upon the
first offense as came to be the case in the England that the Puritans knew.
The Mosaical laws in their sphere operated to the exclusion of any other.7 5
AN EXACT RELATION at 17, 2 SOMERS TRACTS at 93. C.G. COCKE, AN ESSAY OF CHRISTIAN
GOVERNMENT 160 (London 1651) (Beinecke Library, Yale University).
71. E.g., March, Amicus Reipublicae, May 19, 1652, cited in D. VEALL, THE POPULAR
MOVEMENT FOR LAW REFORM 1640-1660, at 117 (1970). The Hale Commission (1652) like-
wise set it down for abolition. Id. at 120 & 138. The doctrine was not abolished until 1827
generally, and for peers in 1841. Id. at 235.
72. C. COCKE, supra note 23, at 70.
73. Speech before the Committee of Ninety-nine of the Second Protectorate Parliament,
April 21, 1657: "To set up, instead of Order, the Judicial Law of Moses, in abrogation of all
our administrations; to have had administered the Judicial Law of Moses pro hic et nunc,
according to the wisdom of any man that would have interpreted the text this way or
that .. " 2 T. CARLYLE, OLIVER CROMWELL'S LETTERS AND SPEECHES 323 (New York
1845). Cocke reports that there was considerable argument in Parliament over the extent to
which the enactment of Moses' Judicials would displace the common and statute law. Some
"desired the drawing of Englands Laws to their primitive rule, namely the Judicials," C.G.
Cocke, supra note 23 at 70, but others objected that there was no proper way to distinguish
the parts of the Judicials which were a Christian duty, counseling that a "rule of pure reason"
founded upon the law of Christ and his doctrine would properly view the Judicials as "a wise
Law, yea the wisest . . . but desired such as were consonant to Christian reason to be estab-
lished amongst us." Id. The New England Puritans did substantially this.
74. LAWS AND LIBERTIES, surpa note 33, at 6.
75. Wolford, The Laws and Liberties of 1648, 28 B.U.L. REV. 426, 461 (1948), argues
that nowhere was colonial independence greater than in the classification of capital crimes.
Consider the sentence pronounced in a bestiality case in New Haven in March 1641/42:
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The existence of this subcode rather suggests a true derogation from
the common law and its whimsically changing statutory directives in favor
of a scripturally mandated system.7 6 True, some provisions did appear and
disappear from the capital laws. Incest was dropped from the list in the
1702 Connecticut revision of the laws, even after the General Court had
found that scripture demanded the death penalty. Adultery had been capi-
tal in the earliest laws, but was downgraded in the 1672 code. Nevertheless,
selection from the Mosaic Law was always permitted. 7' But the important
point to keep in mind is that the Puritans were always careful not to enact
any capital law for which justification could not be found in scripture, even
though those laws might change over time.78 It must be remembered that
despite the strained textual justification in scripture for the Bay Colony's
outlawing of manslaughter, the Mosaic Law would not have countenanced
such a category of homicide and the attendant possibility that a plea of
clergy would result in the defendant's discharge. Consequently, a fair con-
And according to the fundamentall agreemT, made and published by full genRLL
consent, when the plantatio[n] began and government was settled, that the judiciall law
of God given by Moses and expounded in other parts of scripture, so far as itt is a hedg
and a fence to the morrall law, and neither ceremonial nor tipicall, nor had any refer-
rence to Canaan, hath an everlasting equity in itt, and should be the rule of their pro-
ceedings. They judged the crime capitall ...
I NEW HAVEN RECORDS, supra note il, at 69.
76. Sodomy, for example, was always capital in New England; by contrast, in England,
it was, if committed with man or beast, a felony under 25 Hen. 8, ch. 6, was partially repealed
by 2 & 3 Edw. 6, ch. 29, totally by I Phil. & M. I, ch. I, but was revived under 5 Eliz. 1, ch.
.17. E. COKE, supra note 15, at 58.
77. H. Bullinger, Decades, in PURITAN POLITICAL IDEAS, 1558-1794, at 32 (E. Morgan
ed. 1965). Bullinger was a Zwinglianist and mentor of many English Puritans. He had warned
that by applying all the law originally ordained by God for ancient Israel, disregarding the
peculiarities of time, place and national character, "we should seem to shew ourselves more
than half mad." Id. The general parallels that the Puritans perceived between themselves and
the ancient Israelites not only encouraged literal borrowing from the Mosaic Law and the Old
Testament, but bounded their legislative impulses as well. See H. SCHNEIDER, THE PURITAN
MIND 26-27 (1930).
78. Conspiracy against the commonwealth (later, the colony) is not covered by the Pen-
tateuchal law; hence, no scriptural citations are appended in any of the Connecticut codes
(indeed, Cotton's code lacks citations as well). There are, however, references to conspiracy in
the Old Testament, for example, the machinations of Kind David's son Absalom, 2 Samual
15:12, 15:31, or the conspiracy of Baasha against Nadab, King of Israel. The usage in the Old
Testament is descriptive, not injunctive, and so no scriptural authority could be annexed to the
capital provision in the Puritan Capital Lawes. The biblical sense of the term is to do wrong
against another; it appears not to comprehend the notion of plotting against the state, a notion
derived vaguely, it is said, from Germanic and Roman law. See I INT'L STANDARD BIBLE
ENCYCLOPAEDIA, S.v. Conspiracy (G. Bromiley ed. 1979); J. BELLAMY, THE LAW OF TREASON
IN ENGLAND IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES 3-5 (1970). Connecticut's code of 1672, however,
placed the marginal annotation "conspiracy" next to this provision, indicating that there was
likely felt to be a warrant in scripture for what was known from the common law as treason.
Subversion, betraying the state into the hands of foreign enemies and such were aspects of the
common law crime of high treason. See E. COKE, supra note 15, at 2.
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sistency of outlook prevailed, and much the same crimes were successively
proscribed in the Massachusetts, Connecticut and New Haven colonies."
Finally, no better proof of the exclusivity of the Lex Mosis in the mat-
ter of high crimes exists than the Epistles to the early Puritan codes. These
guaranteed no punishment without a sufficiently published law:
It is therefore ordered by this Courte and authority thereof, that
no mans life shall bee taken away . . . no mans person shall be
arrested, restrained, banished, dismembered nor any way pun-
ished . . . unless it bee by vertue or equity of some express Law
of the Country warranting the same, established by a Generall
Courte, and sufficiently published, or in case of defect of a Law
in any particular case, by the Word of God.80
The source of law for crimes was thus closed and circular: what God or-
dained the General Court should enact; what that body failed to enact
God's Word should control.6a
Thus, the Connecticut code of 1672, in its Epistle explaining the rea-
sons for a new edition of the laws, acknowledged the charter of 1662 as a
new source of authority from the Crown, but still accorded first place to
"JEHOVAH the Great Law-giver: Who hath been pleased to set down a
Divine Platforme, not onely of the Morall, but also of the Judicial Lawes,
suitable for the people of Israel." 82 It also made express reference to the
authorities for serious crimes, as if to make the point unmistakable: "We
have endeavored not onely to Ground our Capital Laws upon the Word of
God, but also all our other Lawes upon the Justice and Equity held forth in
79. Haskins & Ewing, The Spread of Massachusetts Law in the Seventeenth Century,
106 U. PA. L. REV. 413 (1957-1958).
80. 1 CONN. RECS. 509. The Epistle to the Massachusetts LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF 1648
similarly had declared that life, personal honor, goods, person and family were not to be tam-
pered with "unles it be by the vertue or equity of some expresse law" or the Word of God.
LAWS AND LIBERTIES, supra note 33 at 1. The GENERAL FUNDAMENTALS OF THE LAWS OF
NEW PLYMOUTH § 4 (1671) contained much the same language, but added, as Massachusetts
and Connecticut did not, that authority was also to be found in "the good and equitable Laws
of our Nation suitable for us, being brought to Answer by due process thereof." The marginal
heading indicates that "our Nation" was: "None to suffer but according to Law of this Colony,
Law of God or Law of England." Id. Goebel spoke of the "irrefragible confidence in the writ-
ten word" as that other dominant Puritan attitude besides biblicism. J. GOEBEL, supra note 60,
at 432.
81. The Massachusetts General Court had, in 1636, decreed that the decisions of the
courts should apply the Word of God, failing any positive law. I MASS. COL. RECS. 174-75 (N.
Shurtleff ed.) (Boston 1853-1854).
82. Much the same language is to be found in the "Adress" to the code of 1658 of
Plymouth Colony. Plymouth Colony Records, Laws 1623-1682, at 72-73, reprinted in, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 267-68 (J. Goebel ed. 1946).
English legal sources were given more direct recognition than by the evasive Connecticut epis-
tle, but these were still announced as secondary to God's ordinances. Id.
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that Word which is a most perfect Rule.""3 A strong statement, this, in
light of the Epistle's attempt to reconcile the predisposition of the 1672
drafters with the language of the royal charter they had so recently ob-
tained. 8' The Epistle did not shrink from raising the issue of legal authority,
but did so in a disingenuous fashion:
Now in these our LAWS, although we may seem to vary or dif-
fer, yet it is not our Purpose to Repugn the Statute Laws of
England, so far as we understand them; professing ourselves al-
wayes ready and willing to receive Light for Emendation or Al-
teration as we may have opportunity; Our whole aim in all being
to Please and Glorifie God, to approve our selves Loyal Subjects
to our Soveraign, and to promove the Welfare of this People,
which will be the more Establishing to his Majesties Crown and
Dignity .... 85
English law now became an acknowledged authority, but hypothetical only,
so long as its operation depended upon the "understanding" or "opportu-
nity" of Connecticut's lawmakers. No actual emendation or alteration of
the capital laws was to come to pass for at least another half-century.
83. EPISTLE, CONNECTICUT GENERAL LAWS OF 1672. The Epistle to the Massachusetts
code of 1658 also paid homage to that body of laws given by God to the Israelites, from which
it declared all its laws were derived: "These were breif [sic] and fundamental principles, yet
withall so full and comprehensive as out of them clear deductions were to be drawne to all
particular cases in future times." LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF 1648 (reprint 1929).
84. If, indeed, the code's prefatory letter was not a mere sop to the sensitivities of the
Crown (see DECLARATION OF THE GENERAL COURT (1646) of Massachusetts, supra note 3),
what it proposed was on the order of local custom in derogation of the common law. This
would not have been unusual in itself, but such customs of local districts did not encompass
felonies. J. GOODENow, HISTORICAL SKETCHES OF THE PRINCIPLES AND MAXIMS OF AMERI-
CAN JURISPRUDENCE 82 (Steubenville 1819). Furthermore, the threat of disallowance overlay
colonial enactments, which was not true of ancient customs or special laws. Connecticut was
increasingly subjected to pressure from the Board of Trade to send over its laws for review.
CONNECTICUT STATE ARCHIVES, I Civil Officers (1669-1724) passim.
85. EPISTLE, supra note 83. In 1698, two years after the appointment of a committee of
revision for the overhaul of the 1672 code, and without doubt in response to pressure from
London, a recommendation was sent to the Governor and Council containing suggestions for
appropriate enactments. One was to prepare a bill "for direction and limitation of lawes of
England, how farre to be in force here." 2 CONN. RECs. 261-62. Nevertheless, no such bill was
ever drafted and Connecticut never formally adopted or clarified the position of English law in
either the colony or the state by some express statute. Fitch v. Brainerd, 2 Day (Conn.) 163,
189 (1805).
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II.
A.
The records of the Connecticut Court of Assistants corroborate what
recent scholarship has found in the course of its review of capital crimes in
other Puritan communities, that is, few convictions and mitigated punish-
ments.86 The small sample of capital cases may be attributed to various
factors. The incidence of serious crime was low where, as in these commu-
nities, the population was dispersed and homogeneous. For that period the
actual number of capital offenses was not great.8 7 The insistence upon the
biblical requirement of two witnesses (Deut. 17:6), incorporated into the
laws, doubtless prevented some defendants from receiving the maximum
penalty that the court could have imposed. 8 There is also the possibility
that the bulk of the Mosaic provisions were, in the actual practice of the
courts, treated more as idealized standards of conduct, such that their se-
verity manifested a potent in terrorem function. 89
Finally, in the proceedings of the courts the spectre of magisterial dis-
cretion looms large. The tension between those factions desiring a written
code with fixed penalties and the advocates of a more unrestricted magiste-
rial discretion is well-documented in Winthrop's Journal. In 1641, the same
year in which the General Court of Massachusetts approved the Body of
Liberties, the magistrates prepared arguments against further attempts to
ground all penalties in certainty. They argued for the proposition that "All
punishments, except such as are made certain in the law of God, or are not
subject to variation by merit of circumstances, ought to be left arbitrary to
the wisdom of the judges."'9 The arguments employed make it clear that
86. E. POWERS, supra note 2, at 252-53, G. HASKINS, supra note 2, at 200.
87. E. POWERS, supra note 2, at 275 states that throughout the Bay Colony's seven-
teenth century history, any capital offender had a very good chance of escaping the noose,
murderers excepted. He calculates that in the period from 1630-1692, of recorded executions,
the total was but fifty-six of fifty-seven for capital crimes, eleven of them for murder.
88. G. HASKINS, supra note 2, at 210. E. POWERS, supra note 2, at 285 recalls the case
(1665) of John Porter, Jr., who as a rebellious son nearly was convicted of that capital offense,
were it not for the fact, according to the court, that the mother had relented "overmoved by
her tender & motherly affection to forebeare" and refused to join her husband in "complaining
& craving justice." But for this lack of two witness-complainants "the Court must necessarily
have proceeded with him as a capitall offendor, according to our law, being grounded upon &
expressed in the Word of God, in Deut. 22:20,21. See Capital Lawes, p. 9, sec. 14." 4 MAss.
COL. RECS. 217-18 (1665), 3 Ct. Assts. 138-39 (1663), 3 Essex County Ct. 111, 117 (1663)
and 227 (1664).
89. Thus, HASKINS, supra note 2 at 152, offers evidence of an order of the General
Court of the Bay Colony that heads of households ensure that their children and apprentices
have "knowledge of the Capital Lawes," citing the LAWS AND LIBERTIES at 11. The same
language was incorporated into the Connecticut Code of 1650. 2 CONN. RECS. 521.
90. 2 J. WINTHROP, supra note 19, at 67.
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they viewed the death penalty not as a punishment to be rigidly employed,
but, in the cases provided, as the "highest degree of punishment which
man's justice can reach." 1 Thus, when they spoke of punishments "certain
in the law of God," what they meant was that the "ground or equity" of the
law was certain as was the nature of the guilt. God Himself, they pointed
out, varied the punishments for the same offences, and they specifically
mentioned manslaughter; and, they queried, because of the circumstances,
it was questionable whether Bathsheba should die for her adultery."
To the objection that the statute laws of England set down "certain
penalty for most offenses," they replied that they were "not bound to make
such examples .. ."" Winthrop, a strong supporter of this point of view,
argued in his essay Arbitrary Government (1644) that prescribed penalties
were unnecessary infringements upon the ability of judges to do justice.94 In
the specific case of capital penalties, Winthrop acknowledged the weight of
capital laws made certain in the law of God, but noted that even here the
penalty was prescribed "onely in such Cases as are betweene party and
party, and that is rather in a waye of satisfaction to the party wronged,
then to Justice and intention."90
In this continuing controversy the magistrates consulted the Reverend
Elders as well. In a series of answers to questions propounded to them in
1644, the Elders said that penalties for the great crimes might be mitigated
out of respect for a man's former worthy contributions to the state. Never-
theless, they held that "[clertain penalties may and ought to be prescribed
to capital crimes, although they may admit variable degrees of
guilt. . ."0' Thus, in respect to Puritan attitudes toward capital punish-
ment for the "great crimes," it is fair to characterize their response as am-
bivalent, unwilling to apply all the biblical "examples" rigidly to current
cases, but also unwilling to draw too many distinctions in light of the hei-
nousness of some of the crimes and in the interests of maintaining order
and Godliness. Of Connecticut specifically, there is virtually no documen-
tary evidence on this point save for Hooker's letter to Winthrop.
From the interplay of these factors, it is scarcely surprising that
neither the records of Massachusetts nor of Connecticut reveal any sentence
of death for idolatry or blasphemy.' 7 In some cases this reluctance to invoke
certain of the capital laws manifested itself in a perhaps deliberate mis-
labelling by the court of the offence. For example, in 1662/63 a defendant
91. Id. at 68.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 69.
94. 4 WINTHROP PAPERS 468 (MASS. HIST. SOCY. 1944).
95. Id. at 477.
96. 2 J. WINTHROP, supra note 19, at 252.
97. E. POWERS, supra note 2, at 255.
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was sentenced in Connecticut for "a flagitious Crime of an high Offence in
saying Christ was a Bastard and she could prove it by scripture." '98 Powers
also makes the argument that the Massachusetts courts seldom applied the
death penalty whenever they could find mitigating circumstances, and de-
spite the fact that death was the only penalty recorded in the law. 9 The
analysis of the magistrates' handling of the biblical ordinance sufficiently
accounts for this observation. The practice was apparently in accord with
Winthrop's view that "the matter of the scripture be always a Rule to us,
yet not the phrase."100
But if New England Puritans were in practice relatively unwilling to
extirpate the sins of the first table of the Decalogue with the severity rec-
ommended by Cartwright and Cotton, they showed less reserve when deal-
ing with crimes of the second table, particularly sexual crimes and those
against the person. These did occasionally lead to the gibbet. Again, Win-
throp, ever attuned to God's special dispensation for New England, re-
counted several cases where great crimes were found out and punished.10'
In Connecticut, the picture was much the same. Holdsworth cites the dele-
tion of adultery from the list of capital laws of the 1672 code as indicative
of a loosening of the strict views of the first generation,0 2 but that same
code also imposed capital punishment for incest and rape for the first
time.103 The one area where the law was much less likely to have been
mitigated out of regard for the value of life or in deference to hearty repen-
tance was that of homicide. The law here, like the other crimes to which
98. Records of the Particular Court, 1639-1663, in 22 CONNECTICUT HISTORICAL SO-
CIETY COLLECTIONS 268 (1928). See also the 1694 case of John Rogers of New London who
actually claimed inter alia that his body was "the humane body of Christ," and worse, made
similarly blasphemous assertions, so it was reported, on the Sabbath. The court ordered, how-
ever, that for this he deserved "severe punishment," sentencing him to a symbolic hanging and
a fine. RECORDS OF THE COURT OF ASSISTANTS AND SUPERIOR COURT, 1687-1715, at 25, N.
LACY, supra note 35, at 209.
99. E. POWERS, supra note 2, at 451.
100. 4 Winthrop Papers 483.
101. 2 J. WINTHROP, supra note 19, at 58-60 recounts the last days of a young man
accused, tried and convicted of buggery with a cow. In accordance with the Mosaical Law the
animal was slain before the prisoner's eyes and he was then hanged. The case is a good exam-
ple of the Puritan notion of "conviction of sin" whereby the offendor was urged to make full
confession; publically proclaim his fault; warn others not to do the same; and ensure eternal
peace for his soul. Cf. I RECORDS OF THE COLONY AND PLANTATION OF NEW HAVEN at 62-73
detailing a similar case. Repentence did not lessen the severity of the punishment, though it
could save souls. The "execution sermon" provided a unique homiletical opportunity for Puri-
tan pastors to exhort the assembled to forswear vice and wickedness and return to God. In a
1677 murder case in Connecticut the court itself appointed a minister "to preach the lecture
that day execution is to be done." CONN. COL. RECS., supra note 43, at 23, N. LACY, supra
note 35, at 69. Few examples of this literary genre survive; a few of the best are collected in I
THE PURITAN SERMON IN AMERICA, 1630-1750 (R. Bosco ed. 1978).
102. W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 14, at 580-81.
103. CODE OF 1672, Capital Lawes.
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the Mosaic Law ascribed the penalty of death, remained scriptural and
unelaborated, but unlike these other offences, the viciousness of this crime
and the physical threat it posed to the community militated against any
mitigation or alteration in the penalty should the matter before the court
have been proved.10 " The exceptions to a finding of willful murder were
narrow. The question is whether Puritan attitudes toward the common law
of crimes were, because of their biblicism, such as to be able to ignore the
wholesome opportunities for the practice of discretion within the bounds of
justice presented by English manslaughter doctrine. A review of the trial
records thus allows us to examine whether the Connecticut courts ever dealt
with cases that might have strained the strict law, and how the courts came
to prepare the way for the reception of this particular doctrine.
B.
Homicide cases not adjudged murder are few in the records, but a gen-
eral idea of how the law was applied can be grasped. The murder provision
by its own terms clearly seemed to allow for two exceptions to its coverage,
corresponding to the familiar legal notions of self-defence and accident, but
application of the Mosaic Law could engender difficulty. In the first place,
self-defence upon necessity is not explicitly covered by the law of Moses: it
is an interpolation of the Talmudic Law105 with which it is doubtful that
the Puritans were familiar. The only instance cited by the Judicial Law is
the killing of a burglar at night by a householder (Exod. 22:1) 1° , for which
no bloodguilt accrued. Consequently, this is the only biblical citation to be
104. J. WINTHROP, in his essay on arbitrary government noted the special circumstances
where God's law required satisfaction as much as punishment for turning away from His will.
He argued that judges' sentences be attuned to the facts and circumstances of each case, yet
allowed that in such cases as these "Justice will not allowe a Judge any Libertye to alter or
remitt any thinge: nor can any circumstance leade to qualification: A Riche man hath the
same right to satisfaction for his goods stollen from him, as a poore man: and the poorest mans
life is the life of man, as well as a Princes." 4 WINTHROP PAPERS 480. Though all of the other
Capital Lawes have fallen to reform efforts, murder remains enmeshed in legal controversy.
Consider the following language from a nineteenth century Massachusetts State Senate
Committee:
There are those, and they constitute a large part of the people of the State, who
believe, that as to this crime, Jehovah himself hath fixed the penalty, and that to abate an
iota of its severity, to violate a law of the Most High.
SEN. Doc. No. 58 (1846) at 22, quoted in E. POWERS, supra note 2, at 315.
105. 8 JEWISH ENCYCLOPAEDIA, supra note 17, at 945.
106. The presumption being that a burglar would likely commit murder. INTERPRETER'S
DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE, S.V. Crimes, at 739 (G. Buttrick ed. 1962). Exodus 22:2 makes it
clear that one could not with impunity slay a thief in the daytime, for theft was punished by
loss of the thief's own property and not his life. Id. The passage from Exodus thus describes a
privilege and not a punishment, again emphasizing the underlying theme in the Old Testament
that life and property were "incommensurable." See Greenberg, Some Postulates of Biblical
Criminal Law, in THE JEWISH EXPRESSION 26-27 (J. Goldin ed. 1976).
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found in Dalton's Countrey Justice, in an expanded context, and it is pre-
cisely this language from his or another's treatise that was adopted by both
the Laws and Liberties of 1648 and by the Connecticut code of 1650, the
rest of Dalton's lengthy discussion of self-defence-apparently having less
warrant in scripture-being omitted. 107 The decision to enact but this nar-
row category, though helpful in amplifying the language "not in a mans
just and necessary defence," nevertheless did not accurately summarize ei-
ther the English law, where some types of self-defence killings did result in
forfeiture and suit for pardon, or both the common law and biblical require-
ments that the killing of a thief was only blameless if done at night.' 08 It
specifically did not clarify whether the common law doctrine of retreat ap-
plied, in cases of avoidable necessity, whereby to kill a "true man," that is,
a man with no felonious intent, demanded special proof of no alternative
but the utter necessity of striking back. Dalton's manual advised: "[It is a
safe principle (in these cases) not to trie an extremitie, till thou hast tried
all meanes."' 9 The Connecticut self-defence statute figures little in the
trial records, except in one late case (1705) which we shall have occasion
shortly to consider.
The other exception to the murder provision, dealing with accidental
killing, was never amplified by other statutory language, and the reason for
this may well be that there were several examples of this category to be
drawn from scripture. The Mosaic Law was not, however, very helpful re-
specting the imposition of penalties. The biblical texts provided for "cities
of refuge" which, once established, would act as places of exile for the ac-
cused."10 A less cumbersome remedy was needed.
The trial records show that the court turned for its remedy to the com-
mon law doctrine of "death by misadventure." This crime involved the do-
ing of a lawful act (without intent to do harm) which occasioned the death
107. Compare the Code of 1650 "manslaughter" provision with the language of Dalton:
To kill an offendor, which shall attempt feloniously to murder or rob me in my
dwelling house, or in or neere any highway, horseway, or footway, or that shall bur-
glarily, to breake my dwelling house in the night; this is iustifiable by my selfe, or by any
of my servants, or company. And this being so found by verdict upon triall, we shall be
all discharged without loss of life, lands, or goods, or pardon.
M. DALTON, supra note 15, at 228-29. The language in W. LAMBARDE, supra note 15, at 215
(ed. 1581/82), is subtantially the same. The primary source is the statute 24 Hen. 8, ch. 5.
108. M. DALTON, supra note 15, at 229, states that to kill such a person in the daytime
would result in forfeiture of the killer's goods and chattels and suit for pardon, unless it could
be shown that the thief-assailant had a felonious intent to kill or rob.
109. Id. at 229-30. Such cases usually involved quarrels followed by swordplay or stab-
bing-not an unusual circumstance in that period. 2 J. STEPHEN, supra note 16, at 59-60.
110. The Rabbis interpreted Numbers 35:22-23 to apply to contributory negligence
only. Complete innocence in an accidental killing did not, for them, require exile, while grave
carelessness-here, approaching the English doctrine-was too serious to be cured by mere
exile. THE PENTATEUCH AND HAFTORAHS 721 n.22 (J. Hertz ed. 1962).
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of a man. The punishment was forfeiture of the killer's goods and the re-
quirement of suit for a pardon."' There would have been no great obstacle
in the way of the Connecticut's use of the common law penalties, for they
were substantially consonant with scripture. According to Dalton:
Homicide by Misadventure or Misfortune, is when any person
doing of a lawful thing, without any evill intent, happeneth to
kill a man: by the law of God there was a citie of refuge ap-
pointed for such person to flie unto. [biblical citations] And by
our Law now, this is no felony of death ... "'
Two cases are of interest. The first is from the records of the Particular
Court for February 14, 1643. The court found that one John Ewe, "by
misadventure," was the cause of the death of one Thomas Scott. Its judg-
ment was that Ewe pay a fine of L.5 "to the Country" and a further L.10
to Scott's widow." 3 Eight years later, in December, 1651, Thomas Allyn
was indicted for carelessly having walked behind his neighbor, Henry Stiles,
with a loaded musket. The gun discharged, killing Stiles. Allyn confessed to
the indictment and the court instructed the jury to find "man Slaughter or
Homicide by misadventure." The latter only found, the court sentenced the
defendant to pay a fine of L.20 "to the Country . . .for his sinful neglect
and Carless [sic] Carriages"; ordered him not to bear arms for a year; and
made his father pay a recognizance of L.10 [ . ].'1" The term "homicide
by misadventure" is employed twice in the record of the 1651 case: there is
little doubt that the court was invoking the terminology of English law (On
the other hand, the reference to "man Slaughter" in this case still is being
used in its common signification.) Nevertheless, the court did not slavishly
follow English precedents. The common law required a forfeiture of all the
goods of the killer to the king "in regard that a subject is killed by his
meanes." ' 5 The Connecticut court not only set a specific amount for a fine
to the commonwealth, but also required restitution to the victim's family.
Restitution is common enough in scripture, but not in circumstances of kill-
ing. No homicide could escape exile by the payment of any ransom: that
would have cheapened life without removing the taint from the land."16
111. M. DALTON, supra note 15, at 224.
112. Id. According to Bacon, the law of God provided, in the case of "misadventure
itself, there were cities of refuge; so that the offender was put to his flight, and that flight was
subject to accident, whether the revenger of blood should overtake him before he had gotten
sanctuary or no." F. BACON, supra note 17 at 297.
113. RECORDS OF THE PARTICULAR COURT, supra note 98, at 25.
114. Id. at 106-107.
115. M. DALTON, supra note 15, at 224. Lambarde says that forfeiture, when exacted in
homicide cases, was out of consideration for "having killed the kings lawful subject." W.
LAMBARDE, supra note 15, at 216.
116. Numbers 35:32-34, M. SULZBERGER, supra note 17, at 143-44. The CONNECTICUT
CODE OF 1672, s.V. Indians, complained that Indian justice was not dealing with those who
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What we probably have here in these cases of death by misadventure is an
admixture of biblical and common law influence with the latter predominat-
ing, because it was both theoretically in harmony with the Judicial Law and
more attuned to the cultural framework of the Puritan settlements. What
we see is the substitution of forfeiture for exile and a deduction that the
former was adequate to remove bloodguilt.1 1 7
Both the Connecticut law of self-defence and these cases of accidental
death demonstrate a magisterial willingness to employ the common law of
crimes when it was approved by or consonant with scripture. As the self-
defence provision demonstrates, however, the reliance upon English law, at
least initially, was rather restrictive. The ability to borrow from the com-
mon law would theoretically have played itself out in the case of a deliber-
ate killing, but one neither occasioned by accident nor by "mallice, hatred,
or Crueltie." For a case of true manslaughter at common law the code pro-
vided no answer and scripture made no such distinction. Conceivably such a
case could have been forced to fit the requirements of the murder statute,
but that was not the result when, on February 15, 1686, a special Court of
Assistants was convened. The instruction given the Grand Jury was as fol-
lows: "Whereas there hath been an Indian Killed at the House of Samuell
Smith of Wethersfield, as is Said by his means. The Grand Jury were Or-
dered to make Inquiry whether he be guilty of Murder, or Man-slaughter,
Homicide, or Chance-medly, or what they shall find. .. ."18 The finding
was that of chance medley.119 The case is remarkable for its use of this
term, one strictly confined to the preserves of the common law and often
employed as a synonym for common law manslaughter. The Grand Jury
apparently understood the implications of the term; so also did the defend-
ant, who immediately submitted himself to the judgment of the court. Tak-
ing advantage of the prior rulings that it had fashioned for death by casu-
alty, the tribunal announced that Smith pay restitution to the deceased's
children.120
Chance medley appears once more in the Records of the Court of As-
sistants, in 1705 in Cuppocosson's Case, and for the first time in the Supe-
rior Court Records for 1712 in that of one Thomas Mitchell. The former
killed other Indians upon English land, "as may take off the guilt of Blood from the
land .. "
117. See Epistle, LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF 1648, supra, at note 83.
118. RECS. OF THE CT. OF AssTs., supra note 98, at 2 [reverse of volume], N. LACY,
supra note 35, at 154.
119. Id. "The Grand Jury make return, that they find Samuell Smith guilty of the death
of the Said Indian only by way of Chance Medley."
120. Id. The sentence of the court was as follows: "This Court having Considered the
Case, and the Custome of the Indians in Such Cases, Do order Samuell Smith to pay to the
Indian Nesecanuns daughters, Four yards of Trucking Cloath, or twelve bushells of Indian
Corn, to be divided by the daughters amongst her relations, as they Shall See Cause."
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involved an attack upon the defendant's family in their wigwam by one
Everes, a "distracted man." The court record states that Everes assaulted
the defendant, who thereupon shot him to death.12 1 The examination of the
prisoner seems to have established that he was not in the wigwam at the
beginning of the assault, but had responded to the uproar, by which time
Everes was outside and on the run, thus making self-defence more difficult
to prove.? 2 The indictment charged murder, and on the same paper is the
following, written in a different hand: "GentlmN of the Graniury if you
find not the Prisoner Guilty of Wilful murder, You may bring in what You
find him Guilty of that is Either Manslaughter of [sic] or Chancemedly of
[sic] or Manslaughter in his own defence. '"" The jury found self-defence,
"described in the laws of this Colony which being by the law blameless."1 "
Mitchell's Case involved a New London shipwright, accused of killing "by
chance-medley without any malice prepenced" a Mohegan, one Sion, by
"striking him on ye head with a stool of six pence value." The prisoner was
found not guilty and was discharged. 2
In each case, the court entertained a homicide theory that had no au-
thority in the Connecticut code of laws, falling neither in the category of
"just and necessary defence," nor that of "mere casualty against his will."
There should have been but two categories of homicide, that by accident or
that in self-defence upon necessity, conforming to Governor Thomas Hutch-
inson's characterization of pre-1691 Massachusetts.12 The insertion of an-
other crime in the scheme amounted to a significant change in the law,' 27
121. RECS. OF THE CT. OF AssTs., supra note 98, at 49-50, N. LACY, supra note 35, at
472. Powers identifies two guilty verdicts in trials for manslaughter in Massachusetts in the
1680's. Both cases resulted in monetary forfeitures, but not execution as decreed by the law.
Both involved assaults resulting in bodily injury and death; one explicitly involved a quarrel,
and the same by implication in the second case. I RECORDS OF THE COURT OF ASSISTANTS OF
THE COLONY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY, 1630-1692, at 242-43, 306-07 & 321 (J. Noble ed.
1901), cited in E. POWERS, supra note 2, at 277-78. In the 1683 case, the defendant was
sentenced to endure branding in the hand and forfeiture of all his goods, a punishment indis-
tinguishable from a successful plea of clergy in English law for the crime of manslaughter.
The temporal affinity of these cases with Smith's case in Connecticut is interesting, perhaps
indicative of some willingness in later practice to consult English law manuals, and in the
exercise of magisterial discretion. As indicated, English manslaughter doctrine, as understood
in the term "chance medley," centered about killings arising from violent quarrels.
122. i C & M supra note 43 at 386.
123, Id. at 387.
124. Id. Note that the jury referenced their decision to the printed laws of the colony.
What would they have done if they had agreed upon a finding of chance medley-merely
return their finding as in Smith's Case?
125. 1 SUPERIOR COURT RECORDS 243.
126. Hutchinson wrote: "They did not make the distinction of manslaughter from mur-
der." I T. HUTCHINSON, THE HISTORY OF THE COLONY AND PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETrS-
BAY 371 (ed. 1936) (1st ed. Boston 1764).
127. The trial records reveal that the Connecticut Court of Assistants in civil cases did
occasionally employ other law, but by the consent of the parties to the suit. An example of this
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for as Hutchinson put it to a grand jury in his day (1765):
I don't know a nation in the world that makes that distinction
between murder and manslaughter which the English do. It was
not made in this country before the charter 1691 for our forefa-
thers founded their laws upon the law of Moses which makes no
such distinction. This may properly be called the benignity of
English law.128
Setting these cases against the background of contemporary English
law is fraught with difficulty, in part because of the sketchiness of the rec-
ord, but largely owing to the ever-shifting doctrinal bases upon which the
term "change medley" rested throughout the seventeenth century." 9 If the
procedure is found in the records for 1700, in an appeal in which the plaintiffs had been
dispossessed and ejected from their ship at New London. The record reads: "It is Aggreed by
Plaintiffs and DefendTs that the Lawes of England Shall be pleaded and made use of in this
Case, and it is allowed of by this Court." CONN. COL. RECS., supra note 43, at 113, N. LACY,
supra note 35, at 322-23. The first references to statutes of Parliament are found in the
records of 1698 in a case brought by the Royal Customs Collector of the Port of New London.
Id. at 88, N. LACY, supra note 35, at 282.
128. G. DALZELL, supra note 5, at 192.
129. The seventeenth century saw a gradual return of chance medley to what it had
been before its elaboration by Elizabethan treatise writers, but lawyers of the next several
generations alternatively associated it with death by accident or killing in self-defence. Hale's
stark and unfinished outline Summary clearly defined chance medley as homicide per infor-
tunium. His complete treatise, Historia Placitorum Coronae, repeated this identification.
Under this heading he gives the following example: "So if a man be felling a tree in his own
ground, and it fall and kill a person, it is chance medley." I M. HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM
CORONAE 472 (London 1736). Dalton gives the same example, classified as misadventure. M.
DALTON, supra note 15, at 224. Michael Foster, writing in the mid-eighteenth century, vigor-
ously attacked Hale's classification of chance medley as misadventure as mistaken. His analy-
sis correctly associated the term with killings which would have once amounted to
manslaughter:
The Term Chance-medley hath been very improperly applied to the Case of acciden-
tal Death, and in vulgar Speech we generally affix that simple Idea to it. But the antient
legal nation of Homicide by Chanced-medley was when Death ensued from a Combat
between the Parties upon a sudden Quarrel.
M. FOSTER, A REPORT OF SOME PROCEEDINGS ETC. DISCOURSES UPON A FEW BRANCHES OF
THE CROWN LAW 275 (1sT ED. 1762) (DUBLIN 1767). Foster traced the history of chance
medley back to a species of killing in self-defence, taking as his source the statute 24 Hen. 8,
ch. 5. That statute, which had attempted by its own terms to resolve a legal ambiguity in the
law of self-defence, had decreed that one who slew a robber or burglar (i.e. one with a feloni-
ous intent) should not suffer any forfeiture or have to sue for a pardon. The ambiguity had
been whether such a killer should forfeit his goods and chattels "as any other person should do
that by chaunce medley should happen to kill, or slea any other person in his or their defence."
24 Hen. 8, ch. 5, collected in F. PULTON, A COLLECTION OF SUNDRIE STATUTES 133-34
(London 1618). Foster argued from this language that chance medley could not be homicide
per infortunium because this statute supposed at least the intent to do great bodily harm "at
the Time the Death happened at least, but did it for the Preservation of his own life." M.
FOSTER at 276. Foster concluded that chance medley was a variety of self-defence, and that it
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Connecticut court got the term from one of the Elizabethan or Jacobean
justice manuals, or Coke's Institutes, which seems more than likely, then it
had to have understood the term as synonymous with that of manslaughter,
that is, a killing "upon the sudden" without malice aforethought." 0 More-
over, the facts of all three cases, so far as the court records reveal them,
appear to support the notion of killings "on the sudden." It is true that
chance medley was variously identified both with avoidable (culpable) self-
defence and with casual or accidental killing. The substance of these usages
lay in the justice manuals, but neither Lambarde, Dalton nor Coke ever
explicitly associated the term with these situations. The only evidence of
such an explicit association of the term chance medley with a fact situation
not amounting to manslaughter which the Connecticut court might have
seen, to the extent to which this can be determined, is part of the Rhode
Island statute of 1664 (supra), which stated: "That whosoever shall be
Lawfully convicted, of Killing any Person by Chance Medley or Misadven-
encompassed the hypothetical case in which a man embroiled in the heat of a sudden affray
"quitted the Combat before a mortal Wound given, and retreated or fled as far as he could
with Safety, and then urged by meer Necessity killed his Adversary for the Preservation of his
own Life." Id. Foster was aware of how near this scenario was to manslaughter as known in
the courts of his day, and he draws a perhaps too facile distinction between the two:
This Case bordereth very nearly upon Manslaughter, and in Fact and Experience the
Boundaries are in some Instances scarce perceivable: but in Consideration of Law they
have been fixed. In both Cases it is supposed that Passion hath kindled on each Side, and
Blows passed between the Parties. But in the Case of Manslaughter it is either presumed
that the Combat on both Sides both continued to the Time the mortal Stroke was given,
or that the Party giving such Stroke was not at that Time in imminent Danger of Death.
Id. at 276-77. Foster's association of chance medley with homicide se defendendo found its
way into 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *184, and thence into modern definitions. E.g.,
D. WALKER, OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 202 (1980).
On the other hand, manslaughter during the latter seventeenth and early eighteenth cen-
turies became more closely related to those theories upon which murder doctrine had made
such great strides. Greater emphasis was placed upon the relation of malice to intent and the
role of provocation. See, e.g., R. v. Mawgridge, Kel. 119, 84 E.R. 1107, 9 St. Tr. 61, S.C.
(Holt, J. 1707). A contemporary source defined it as differing from murder "because it is not
done with foregoing malice and from Chance-medley, because it has a present intent to kill."
BLOUNT'S LAW DICTIONARY, S.V. Manslaughter (London 1670). With the ascendance of prov-
ocation as that doctrine's chief animating concept, chance medley's rather quaint and confus-
ing notions of "sudden fury" declined, although their persistence throughout the eighteenth
century is evident in both Foster's and Blackstone's efforts to establish it on a firmer concep-
tual footing.
130. According to Dalton, "[mianslaughter, otherwise called Chancemedlye, is when
two doe fight together upon the sudden, and by meere chance, without any malice precedent,
and one of them doth kill the other; this also is felony of death." M. DALTON, supra note 15,
at 222. Coke's views have already been noted. E. COKE, supra note 15, at 54-55. According to
Pulton, whose work was known in Massachusetts, "[m]slaughter, otherwise called Chance-
medley, is when two do fight together upon the suddaine, without any malice precedent, and
one of them doth kill the other, in which case the offendor shall have his clergy." F. PULTON,
DE PACE REGIS ET REGNI AT Fo. 120 (London 1610). See also CROMPTON, L'OFncE ET.
AUTHORITIE DE JUSTICES DE PEACE 20 (London ed. 1584).
Wrinn: Manslaughter and Mosaicism in Early Connecticut
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1987
306 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ture, shall forfeit his Goods and Chattels. ,,'s Also, there is evidence
of some English printed sources like Matthew Hale's (d.1676) summary,
Pleas Of The Crown, published in 1678, which might have made their way
to the colonies. In that work, for instance, the author explicitly defines
chance medley as homicide per infortunium, that is, misadventure or acci-
dent: "Chance medley, where a Man doing a lawful act, without intent of
hurt to another, and death casually ensues."13
Thus, although it would be theoretically more consistent with the
printed law to think of the court's applying the law of self-defence or acci-
dent, the aforementioned cases deny this possibility. The court in Smith's
Case submitted only two theories to the jury, murder or chance medley; if it
had thought that it had a case of death by misadventure or homicide in
self-defence, it would not have cast the charge to the jury in this language.
Moreover, in Cuppocosson's Case, the court explicitly gave chance medley
and "manslaughter in his own defense" to the jury as entirely separate find-
ings suitable for a special verdict (that is, if they could not bring in a ver-
dict of murder on the general issue). If, then, the court knew that it was
applying a category of homicide unsanctioned by the printed law, it must
have done so either through magisterial discretion-which raises the issue
of how rigorously it felt itself bound by the code and scripture-or, just
possibly, from a view that this crime too was sanctioned by scripture. This
latter supposition is based upon language in Dalton who, after stating that
chance medley as manslaughter was nonetheless felony of death, states:
"And yet in case of manslaughter, the offender shal [sic] have the benefit of
Clergy: and by the law of God, there was a citie of refuge appointed for
such to flee unto. Exod. 21:13, Deut. 19:3,4."1'a No matter that Dalton had
misconstrued the meaning of the citation from Exodus (really a casual or
unwitting killing) or the Mosaic Law in general; no matter that it was clear
to contemporary Puritans that the English doctrine of manslaughter was
incompatible with the Mosaic Law; no matter that benefit of clergy was to
those selfsame Puritans superstitious and popish as well:""4 the association
between the crime and scripture, however unharmoniously accomplished,
may have provided a "warrant" for the Connecticut court. Failing that,
could the court have been so cynical as to have done this more out of sym-
pathy for the English defendant than his Indian victim?... Suffice it to say,
131. RHODE ISLAND ACTS COLLECTED, supra note 44, at 4.
132. M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 26 (London 1678).
133. M. DALTON, supra note 15, at 222.
134. Of the benefit of clergy Governor Hutchinson remarked of the Puritans of Massa-
chusetts that they considered it to be "of popish extract, and burning in the hand with a cold
iron appeared to them a ridiculous ceremony." T. HUTCHINSON, supra note 126, at 371.
135. Cf. W. BRADFORD, HISTORY 432-35 (ed. 1898) (1st ed. Boston 1856) (detailing
how, in 1638, three whites were hanged in Plymouth Colony for the robbery and murder of an
Indian. Governor Bradford reported that some of the English questioned whether any white
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whatever the court's motivation, its decision to employ a legal doctrine
heretofore expressly outlawed in both Massachusetts and New Haven, and
unaccounted for in Connecticut's laws, occurred some years before the sup-
posed first employment of English manslaughter law in a 1712 trial which,
unlike that of shipwright Mitchell, proceeded to verdict.1 36
B.
That case, the trial of Daniel Gard of Stonington, unfolded in New
London in September, 1712. Gard had had a falling out with one William
Whitear, a stranger, at the house of a third party. He had "challenged sD
Whitear to fight; whereupon they went out of the house, and closed in with
one another .... -1"7 In the course of the ensuing struggle, Gard struck
Whitear a mortal blow from which the latter died a few days later. The
Queen's attorney obtained an indictment for murder, but the jury returned
the case to the bench with special facts that certainly would have warranted
a finding of death by chance medley. The court did not direct such a ver-
dict; indeed, a portion of the court record unreported in Hoadly's note on
the case in the Public Records Of The Colony Of Connecticut suggests that
the charges might have been dropped altogether but for the court's inter-
vention.186 In view of the tribunal's subsequent appeal to the General As-
sembly on the issue of the English law of manslaughter and its subsequent
finding of that crime, 13 9 it may have intended the appeal to come up from
the first, not an unreasonable assumption given the position of the Assist-
ants as both judges and legislators.1 40
should lose his life for an Indian's. They were punished nonetheless, there being, aside from
legal justification, the threat of Indian reprisal or war. See also I PLYMOUTH COLONY
RECORDS 96-97 (1638), cited in E. POWERS, supra note 6, at 302. The Connecticut records,
however, reveal no comparable cases.
136. "The most convincing evidence of the rejection of the common law is found in the
record before the General Assembly of two cases in which persons were tried for crimes that
were known to the common law, but not recognized by the statutes of the State." D. LooMis,
THE JUDICIAL AND CIVIL HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT 80 (1895). The 1719 act is noted at id.,
95-96.
137. 1 SUPR. CT. RECS. 258. The special verdict continued: "and that the prisoner threw
sD Whitear on the ground and fell with him, and there lay until they were parted; and that
said Whitear said he told the prisoner immediately he had killed him."
138. "John Gard of Stonington committed to ye Gaol of New London upon Suspicion of
Murdering one Wilim Whitear was cleared by Proclamation and this Court saw not Reason to
acquitt him of ye Charge of his Prosecution." Id. at 260.
139. Id. at 265 ("are of the Opinion that it is but Manslaughter").
140. One critic of the colony's affairs said: "[A]nd in the general court, which also takes
cognizance of appeals from the court of assistants, tho' . . . the same judges (tho' it may be
more assistants with a great crew of deputies added to them) that you had in the court of
assistants; and hence, partly by their vice, and partly by their influence upon the rest, there is
little benefit to be expected by appeals." Bulkeley, Will & Doom, or the Miseries of Connecti-
cut (1692), in 3 CONNECTICUT HISTORICAL SOCIETY COLLECTIONS 105 (1895).
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The appeal itself was unexceptional in form. It was customary for the
General Court (later renamed the General Assembly) to hear questions
from magistrates relating to the construction of Connecticut's laws.' 4' This
was natural and expected in a legal system which did not admit of unwrit-
ten or judge-made law. Just prior to the 1672 revision of the code of laws,
the Deputy Governor and Assistants had before them a clear case of incest
by one Thomas Rood with his daughter Sarah. The court first canvassed
the area clergy whether the crime was capital. It received an affirmative
response. 142 Desiring to know the status of the sin in the colony's laws, for
there was not provision for it in the code of 1650, it put the following ques-
tion before the General Court:
Whether the law of this Colony that orders in defect of a lawe
we should have recourse to the word of God for oR lawe, and
seeing the word of God doth anex death to be the penalty of
Incest, whether such person or persons that have comitted that
sin ought not to be put to death. .... 1.1
The General Court, as expected, held to scripture in defect of the code:
"[Sluch persons as are proved to be guilty of Incest, they ought by the lawe
of God and oR lawes as now they stand to be put to death.' 44 The court
sentenced the father to death; his daughter to be severely whipt "that
others may heare and feare."' 5
Similarly, the court in Gard's Case raised its question in reference to
the language of the code:
The question being put by the HonBle the Judges of the Supe-
rior Court 1. whether upon a tryall for murther, and verdict
brought in . . . the judges ought to determine the point . . by
the rules of the Common law, there being not so particular di-
rection for the resolution of that point contained in our printed
laws, and to give judgment accordingly; 2. If upon debate the
crime . . . appear to be manslaughter and so determined, it is
further queryed, what direction the judges ought to have refer-
ence to in determining the punishment and giving
sentence .... '"
This request was, however, singular in other ways. Beginning about the
turn of the century, the appellate jurisdiction of the General Assembly was
141. I N. OSBORN, supra note 8, at 440.
142. 1 RECORDS OF THE COURT OF ASSISTANTS 1-13 & 15, Connecticut State Archives,
I ECCLESIASTICAL PAPERS 39.
143. 2 CONN. RECS. 184.
144. Id.
145. Id. The language is scriptural. Deuteronomy 19:20.
146. 5 CONN. RECS. 350-51.
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periodically restricted and made specific to the end of dispensing with re-
view of petty crimes; examining decisions of the Superior Court for error;
and exercising equity powers in civil cases. Interlocutory appeals for "guid-
ance" were unusual, even as early as 1712.1" What the court was asking
permission to do was clearly a departure from its past conduct. It was a
recognition that the murder statute as its stood in the Captiall Lawes was
insufficient for the needs of the bench; it was an admission that the Word of
God was not sufficiently detailed or relevant to the questions which these
judges were now asking in this area of the law. English answers were
needed for increasingly English ways of legal thinking. This was already the
case in the area of private law where acts of parliament were unabashedly
cited and utilized, though sometimes only with the permission of the
litigants. 4 8
Given permission by the General Assembly to apply English law, 4 9 the
judges in Gard's Case ignored the otherwise lenient punishment afforded
the successful plea of clergy and decreed:
That he the said Daniel Gard shall stand upon the gallows, with
a halter about his neck, and the other end cast over the gallows,
the space of one hour, and then be taken down and whipt on his
naked body thirty nine stripes; and then be returned to prison,
there to remain until he shall pay the charge of his prosecution
and commitment. 60
Gard's punishment resembled that meted out with increased frequency by
the court in cases involving the capital laws. While some "symbolic hang-
ings" were ordered in those cases in which the evidence was insufficient for
conviction, others were regularly prescribed for those religious and sexual
offenses that otherwise might have ended in execution.'' Thus, although a
major change had been effected in the law, it was masked by the court's
147. THE SUPERIOR COURT DIARY OF WILLIAM JOHNSON 1772-1773, Intro. at xvi (J.T.
Farrell ed. 1942). Farrell specifically notes the Gard case as an oddity.
148. See supra note 127.
149. 5 CONN. RECS. 350-51.
150. 1 SUPR. CT. RECS. 265. The number of lashes is scriptural. Deuteronomy 25:3 and
2 Corinthians 11:24 ("Of the Jews five times received I the forty stripes save one.") See also
RECS. OF CT. OF AssTs., supra note 98, at 24; N. LACY, supra note 35, at 417 (the court
(1703) ordered the defendant "to be Severely whipt not Exceeding fortie Stripes .... ")
151. In a later (1703) incest case, the Connecticut court sentenced a step-father to a
symbolic hanging, a whipping and obliged him perpetually to wear the letter "I" upon his
clothing for sexual relations with his wife's daughter. RECS. OF CT. OF ASSTS., supra note 98,
at 24, N. LACY, supra note 35, at 417. The first symbolic hanging as can be determined from
the records occurred in 1662 in Abigail Bets' case. See supra note 98. Her sentence was to be
escorted "as a Malefactor to yE place of Execution wearing a rope about her neck and to
ascend up the ladder at yE Gallowes to yE open view of Spectators that all Israill may hear
and feare." RECORDS OF THE PARTICULAR COURT, supra note 98, at 268.
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traditional behavior. The printed code itself remained unaltered to reflect
the new changes in homicide law.152
The foregoing review of homicide cases from the records of the Con-
necticut Court of Assistants points to magisterial discretion as the vehicle
for the introduction of substantive aspects of the common law. In those
cases of accidental death where the code of laws already provided a justifi-
cation but no penalty, it was easiest to import much of the English doctrine
of misadventure. The contours which the accidental death exception re-
ceived at the hands of the Assistants were not entirely in accord with that
law, but then the borrowing was more pragmatic than dutiful. They took no
more, arguably, than they needed to give effect to what scripture endorsed
if not what it demanded in terms of remedy. In the case of self-defence, it
appears that clarification was sought in the justice manuals, but the lan-
guage borrowed was broader then the justification contained in scripture.
Whether this result be ascribed to carelessness or opportunity cannot be
determined.
That magisterial discretion also provided for the introduction of the
doctrine of chance medley, however, is not so readily reconciled with the
model of legal activity that the Mosaic Laws have suggested. Such activity
does coincide with what some have described as that cooling of the Puritan
ardor which, at length, permitted particular rules of the common law to be
utilized when the local codes were unavailing, or as standards of interpreta-
tion when those laws could not otherwise be interpreted."'5 The records do
not reveal whether chance medley was ever the subject of an opinion from
the General Court. If, in fact, no such question was ever put to that body,
then here is evidence of a departure from the customary deference to the
laws, scripture and, indeed, from such informal precedent as existed. Did
the Assistants fear that a request to elaborate upon the law of homicide
would meet with opposition? It might have engendered an undesirable polit-
ical debate.' 5' Throughout this period Connecticut legislators assiduously
avoided the major issues of both political and legal conformity with Eng-
land. On the other hand, perhaps the greater opposition lay among the
clergy and scripturalists within the commonwealth who, like the Reverend
Elders of the Bay Colony, found the punishment for the crime of man-
slaughter in English law disproportionately more lenient when compared to
that for murder. In sum, if the discretion of the bench was responsible for
an extralegal expansion of the homicide law, the significance that Gard's
152. The colony's first incest case had led to a prompt addition to the capital laws;
Gard's case did not, even though a new version of the code of laws was soon to be prepared in
1715.
153. READINGS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 235 (M. Howe ed. 1971).
154. The outline of such a debate is repeatedly framed in the Rev. Bulkeley's tract. See
infra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
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Case holds was not that it was the first occasion upon which the common
law of crimes was applied in Connecticut, but that it occurred at a time
when the Assistants finally were emboldened to bring the matter into the
open. Nevertheless, they circumspectly asked only for a ruling in the partic-
ular case, perhaps testing political and religious opinion, and the General
Assembly itself did not hurry to alter the capital laws in order to reflect the
change in the law which their decision had made. 5 '
III.
A.
The specific antecedents of this unprecedented request for authority to
judge by the common law are obscure. External events could, arguably,
make a case for yielding to common law ways. Ample evidence exists of
increased tension from the 1690's onward between the colony and the
Board of Trade; tension reflected in repeated requests by the Board of the
colony to send over its laws for examination; 156 tension reflected in a com-
mittee resolution directed to the governor in 1698 querying to what extent
English law was in force in the colony. 157 The old Puritan political and
social structure had been stressed in the prior decade by the royal governor-
ship of Sir Edmund Andros and in the last two decades by demographic
change. 58 The sum of such forces at large, however, does not make a really
persuasive case for the perceived need to alter the criminal law of the col-
ony. To it must be added the far more interesting if narrower legal question
of the extent to which there was a viable conflict of legal authority at issue
behind these proceedings in New London.
Gard's Case itself offers little guidance to one seeking some specific
legal necessity for the judges' precipitous action. Other evidence from the
period does indicate that the question of legal authority on the level of pro-
ceedings (as opposed to broader concerns in the matter of governance) did
occasionally surface. A most interesting document from the 1690's is the
Rev. Gershom Bulkeley's Will and Doom, a rambling jeremiad aimed at
Connecticut's government and judiciary. The Reverend Mr. Bulkeley,
sometimes justice of the peace in New London, was an ardent supporter of
Crown policies and supervision. His intention in writing Will and Doom
was to demonstrate that the resumption of the old charter government after
the period of Andros' royal governorship in the late 1680's had been illegal
155. 5 CONN. REcs. 351.
156. C. ANDREWS, supra note 43, at 11.
157. 2 CONN. RECS. 261-62.
158. See supra note 39 . For changes in Connecticut society at large, see R. BUSHMAN,
supra note 40, at 83, wherein he notes that Connecticut's population increased by 58 percent
between the years 1670 and 1700, and between 1700 and 1730 by some 280 percent.
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and a usurpation of what Bulkeley supposed was, at last, the bringing to
heel under Crown rule of a stubbornly independent colonial administration.
The chief blessing of this restoration had been a recognition of the preemi-
nence of English law, both common and statute.1 59 This charge, that the
Assistants did not sufficiently conform the colony's laws to those of Eng-
land, Bulkeley made repeatedly in his tract, along with the more particular
argument that as a charter corporation the colony was legally incapable of
enacting of its own accord capital laws:
The charter gave them a power to make laws not repugnant or
contrary to the laws of England, and to erect judicatories to
hear and determine matters civil and criminal, and to impose
lawful fines, etc., according to the course of other corporations
within the realm of England; and hence, such laws as the corpo-
rations in England may and do lawfully make, they might have
made, but not such as only the king and parliament may
make .... 160
Thus, it was his view that the English common law of crimes and statutory
amendments thereof controlled completely in Connecticut, and he railed at
what had become the centerpiece of Puritan justice, the broad discretion
exercised by judges.1 61 How apparent and how heartfelt was Bulkeley's as-
sessment of legal affairs in the colony is unclear, but his views were judged
to merit a printed response from the Assistants. 6 ' Will and Doom clearly
159. Bulkeley levelled four charges against the resumed charter government, the third of
which was:
The abolition of the common and statute laws of England, and so of all human laws
except the forgeries of our own popular and rustical shop and the dictates of personal
discretion, and hence a most prodigious ignorance, as of our just liberties and rights, so of
our bounden duty, both to the king and to one another. A strange fancy that, coming over
from England to another of the king's dominions, we should so far cease to be his subjects
as that the laws of our king and nation should not reach us, but we are become like Jews
a separate people, that must have laws different from all other parts of our nation.
Bulkeley, supra note 140, at Preface. Indeed, Bulkeley, perhaps without seeing past his own
invective, had touched upon the heart of the matter, the whole purpose of the Puritan govern-
ment there in New England since the first settlements some sixty years previous.
160. Id. at 11. See, I J. WINTHROP JOURNAL 324 (J. Hosmer ed. 1908) expressing
similar concerns about the time (1639) of the preparation of the BODY OF LIBERTIES, and
again in 1646. Winthrop sets forth arguments why by charter the colony was possessed of a
government furnished with all the requisite parts and with a self-sufficiency which required but
general allegiance to the Crown, the relation between Massachusetts and the king being not
unlike that of the Hanse Towns of the Holy Roman Empire. 2 Id. at 290-91.
161. Bulkeley, supra note 140, at 114.
162. Allyn & Treat, Their Majesties Colony of Connecticut in New England Vindicated
(Boston 1694), in I CONNECTICUT HISTORICAL SOCIETY COLLECTIONS 83-130 (Hartford
1860). P. MILLER, supra note 24, at 153, describes Will & Doom as "the first explicitly an-
tidemocratic utterance in our literature .. " A copy of Bulkeley's tract was sent to London
in 1704 by Joseph Dudley as part of a campaign to get Connecticut's charter revoked. Sir
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raises the ultimate issue of legal authority and brings down to the level of
the administration of justice broader themes of biblicism, Puritanism and
the relation of king's law to that of God.163
Bulkeley illustrated his charges with a case which has some relevance
to the present discussion of the nature of legal authority in the colony. He
was outraged by the irregularities of the trial of one Mercy Brown of Wal-
lingford, which took place in 1691. The point upon which certain questions
were raised was the defendant's mental state at the time she slew her adult
son, and it is the first known instance in the colony's court records of any-
thing like an insanity issue going to the jury. Though at length found guilty,
the jury having great difficulty bringing in a verdict on the general issue,
she was not sentenced. The court deferred "by reason of Some difficulty in
this Case."' 64 Bulkeley in Will and Doom accused the court of badgering
the jury, reversing presumptions with respect to proof of insanity and
swearing in a jury from the Hartford area, far away from where she had
committed the deed, but he does not indicate that he had been asked to
fashion an appeal on her behalf to the General Court.165
His appeal argued two major points, that of non compos mentis and,
predictably, his position that the colony, as a corporation, had no jurisdic-
Henry Ashurst, representative of the colony in England, excoriated Will & Doom before the
Cabinet, but more helpful to the colony than anything he had to say in its defence was the
premature filing of the manuscript in the Public Records Office, from which place it did not
emerge until the end of the nineteenth century. Id. at 154-55.
163. Of the first law in the colony's code calling for no punishment, forfeitures, etc. in
defect of a properly published statute or in defect of that the Word of God Bulkeley cynically
remarked that by this "new Magna Charta" "all the law of England (common, or statute, or
other) is exploded at once; it can neither hurt nor help us, unless it receive a new sanction from
this general court. Verily the king and parliament have met with their match. All the law and
authority in England cannot hang a traitor in Connecticut." Bulkeley, supra note 140, at 107.
With respect to criminal procedure, Bulkeley noted that: (1) recognizances and appearances
for criminal behavior were taken in the name of the corporation and not domino regi ("to his
majesty the king") as required by 33 Hen. 8, ch. 39, "for it must be supposed that we have no
breach of the peace, misbehavior, or any other crime, by the violation of any of the King's
laws, but only of the laws of this corporation"; (2) defendants were indicted, tried and con-
victed upon Connecticut's code of laws and not those of the king; (3) the peace of the land was
known as the Peace of the Colony and never as the King's Peace; (4) indictments were not
framed in the traditional manner contra pacem regis, coronam et dignitatem suam etc., but
"against the peace and dignity of the corporation, (for the corporation gives us all our laws,
directly contrary to the statute 27 Hen. 8, ch. 24 and 4 Edw. 3, ch. 2, which last statute
requires indicted persons to be delivered by the common law, and not by the private laws of
corporations)"; and (5) criminal defendants were not regularly tried before a jury ex vicineto
(i.e., where the crime had taken place, as customary at common law). Id. at 109. It should be
noted that most of these irregularities vanished, as the Connecticut court records attest, not
long into the eighteenth century.
164. RECS. OF THE CT. OF AssTs., supra note 98, at 12, N. Lacy, supra note 35, at 175.
165. i C & M, supra note 43, at 182.
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tion to try felones. The appeal,1 6 it appears, was successful, for sentence
was not passed. The Assistants, however, delayed a ruling upon the matter
for nearly two years, then declared the unfortunate woman to have been
"distracted." They finally remitted her to the custody of magistrates in
New Haven for an indeterminate period of confinement.16 7
Even if due allowance is made for the relatively underdeveloped state
of the colony's judicial machinery, the protracted nature of this proceeding
is unusual. The court's hesitation may well have had much to do with larger
questions of the application of law; and, it might have been asked, that of
which law or laws. How telling had been the assertions made by the Rev.
Bulkeley, and had this been a case where the finer points of English juris-
prudence-to the extent the Assistants could take stock of it-were better
able to point the way to a just disposition of the matter? The colony's code
of laws did not address the matter and scripture provided little instruction
for the treatment of those whom the Mosaic Law' 68 already regarded as
divinely punished for their sin (it in fact raised the possibility that her mad-
ness was the result and not the cause of her deed). But the Assistants may
not have had to reach and determine the ultimate issue to which Bulkeley
had addressed his appeal, that being whether the law of England was de
jure that of Connecticut. Among the files of the General Court is preserved
a petition submitted by the prisoner's husband advancing an altogether dif-
ferent argument on her behalf. Unlike Bulkeley's appeal, this one inge-
niously analogized the defendant's situation to that of one who slays in er-
ror (that is, by accident):
According to the law of God & the kingdom no person is quilty
of murther unless mallice premeditated boe proved or legally
implied. . . J humbly Pray therefore that as the laws of God
the laws and statutes of this kingdom have provided an asylum
or place of Refuge for the manslayer who slays not through
guile but god delivers into his or her hand that so by the wis-
dome and mercy of this Court Such methods may bee used in
the Business before ye. .... 169
The argument is distinctly biblical, advancing for the court's consideration
the texts from Exodus and Numbers dealing with sudden, inexplicable (save
to God) but accidental killings and the notion of cities of refuge to which
the perpetrator of such an act could flee and live in exile. It is not unreason-
able to suggest that the Assistants might have found this argument alto-
gether more persuasive than Bulkeley's assertion that they could not sen-
166. Id.
167. RECS. OF THE CT. OF AssTs., supra note 98, at 19, N. LACY, supra note 35, at 193.
168. Deuteronomy 28:28.
169. I C & M, supra note 43 at 180.
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tence her to death owing to their mishandling of trial procedures or lack of
jurisdiction over the felony in the first place. The chief virtue in Samuel
Brown's petition was its assumption that the resolution of the case was yet
findable in scripture and, hence, in conformity with the colony's code of
laws.
The serious and yet unresolved issues of law and legal authority raised
by Brown's Case surfaced again in another murder trial much closer in
time to that of Daniel Gard. Abigail Thompson was tried for the murder of
her husband in 1705/06.170 In the course of an argument she had thrown a
pair of scissors which, striking him upon the head, pierced his temple; he
died some two weeks later. Mrs. Thompson swore that she had not intended
to kill him, but the jury, again after "Sometime of Withdrawing and Con-
sideration" found her guilty as charged. Four of the judges postponed the
execution of her sentence and took an appeal to the Governor and the rest
of the Assistants. These stayed her execution and more than a year later
they still had not decided what to do, "seeing the Case of the sD Prisoner is
attended with great difficulty."' 71
The question raised by this case was a difficult one: how to take the
measure of the intent to harm when the results of the act were all out of
proportion to the harm intended or the provocation received. Resolving this
case by any of the acknowledged authorities was an improbability. Scrip-
ture was of no avail; the striking of another with any implement of iron or
wood capable of causing death was murder.17 2 Neither accident nor self-
defence could be proved. The testimonies gathered for trial, if they can be
believed, show that she was an abusive wife and that she probably did in-
tend to cause some harm short of death to her husband. 7 a The court could
not make the case into one of chance medley; that doctrine was limited by
the justice of the peace manuals and, it appears, by the usage of the Con-
necticut court to assaults with deadly weapons, not to the circumstances of
170. REcs. OF THE CT. OF Asss., supra note 98, at 56-59, N. LACY, supra note 35, at
485.
171. 2 C & M, supra note 43 at 5. The records do not reveal the final disposition of the
case.
172. Numbers 35:16-18. The Pentateuch and Haftorahs, supra note 110, at 721 n.16
comments that "[a]s the fundamental distinction is one of intention, everything depends upon
the weapon used." It is, therefore, of no little interest to note that the indictment in this case, 2
C & M 6a, charged that she "didst wickedly, wilfully Mattitiously and violently Throw an
Instrument of Iron viz.T a pair of Taylor Sheares at the head of Thomas Thompson....
CONN. COL. CT. RECS., supra note 43, at 56.
173. Id. at 57-58, N. LACY, supra note 35, at 488-93. They report that she had goaded
him with a chair and had thrown stones at him. Unfortunately for the defendant, one of the
affiants recalled that she had told another woman that she often slept with a knife by her side
and that she would kill him "if he would not growe better." REcs. OF CT. OF AssTs., supra
note 98, at 58, N. LACY, supra note 35, at 490.
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domestic quarrels even if "on the sudden. '174
The court was confronted with issues that called for the application of
common law manslaughter-intent and provocation. The prisoner at her
trial admitted throwing the shears, but swore that she had no intention of
killing with them. 175 Furthermore, she testified that she had been provoked
by him who had "Struck her upon the breast with a broom."1 76 The Gen-
eral Assembly chose not to act but to direct that the governor "procure the
best advice that may be had in the case."1 7 7 That advice may have resulted
in the odd turn that Gard's Case took but four years later.
174. Dalton gives the following example in his justice manual:
The husband, upon words betweene him and his wife, suddenly stroke his wife with a
pestell, whereon she died, and it was adiudged murder at the Assizes at Stafford before
Walmesley, 43 Eliz. Quaere the reason why it should be murder ...considering there
appeareth no precedent malice, and that it was done upon the sudden, and upon
provocation.
M. DALTON, supra note 15, at 219. M. HALE, supra note 129, at 456, recounts that a case had
come up for discussion at Sergeants' Inn in 1675 in which a party, responding to the insulting
words of another, had thrown a broomstaff and had killed the victim by a blow to the head.
The judges agreed that mere words were an insufficient provocation to mitigate the deed from
murder to manslaughter, but could reach no consensus as to whether the nature of the instru-
mentality-which ordinarily would never be viewed as a lethal weapon-should mitigate the
deed. (The prisoner eventually received a king's pardon.) Holt, J. in Mawgridge, supra note
129, at 131-32, cites D. Williams' case, W. Jones 423, 82 E.R. 227, in which a hammer was
thrown in anger upon an insult received. Holt agreed with the court which excused the defend-
ant of murder under the Statute of Stabbing, Jac. 1, ch. 8 (1603), but found him guilty of
common law manslaughter on the ground that "it is not such a weapon, or act that is within
that statute .. " He thought that an indictment for murder would have been good, because
"the provocation did not amount to that degree, as to excite him designedly to destroy the
person that gave it him." Cf., Rowly's Case, originally reported by Coke and involving this
same issue of the instrumentality employed. Foster commented that Coke was "totally silent"
about these circumstances, reporting only that the killing in that case-a father's having run
after and cudgelled a boy who had bloodied his son-was ruled manslaughter because "done in
sudden Heat and Passion." The reason for Coke's silence very likely rests on no other grounds
than that he was satisfied that manslaughter had been proved, because the killing was done on
the sudden; the inquiry that Foster is making about the circumstances of the act (e.g., the
degree to which the child was beaten and the type of weapon used) typifies the greater sophis-
tication of his day's approach to the crime of manslaughter. M. FOSTER, supra note 129, at
294-95. For a similar analysis in the context of a law officer's pursuit and subjugation of a
fleeing defendant, see id. at 271. See also Watts v. Brains, Cro. Eliz. 778, Noy 171, 78 E.R.
1009 (1600). J. BAKER, supra note 16, at 285, cites this as an early case applying the notion of
provocation to the circumstances of a sudden quarrel. The case involved a shopkeeper's having
struck a customer who had tweeked his nose and made faces at him. The defendant was origi-
nally indicted and convicted of manslaughter; on appeal the crime was held to have been mur-
der, there being insufficient grounds for a quarrel.
175. RECS. OF CT. OF Assrs., supra note 98, at 57, N. LACY, supra note 35, at 487.
176. The record strongly intimates that she was pregnant at the time, this perhaps ex-
plaining the violence of her reaction. REcs. OF CT. OF AssTs., supra note 98, at 59, N. LACY,
supra note 35, at 493.
177. 2 C & M, supra note 43 at 92. No further mention is made of the case.




Only several years after that appeal did the General Assembly take the
sweeping step of allowing the use of the common law in all cases which
Connecticut law could not resolve nor for which scripture could provide an
answer. An otherwise undated resolution, among the Assembly's papers for
the year 1717, reads as follows:
Resolved by this Assembly that wheresoever any Matter, Ques-
tion or Difficulty shall happen in any of our courts of judicature
wherein no rule can be found in ye express Acts of this govT nor
in ye word of God any thing can be found in which ye Court can
concurr for ye deciding the Point in Question That ye Judges
shall determine ye matter by ye laws of England known by ye
Books to be then in force.1 78
The traditional sources of law retained their preeminence: a court must still
adjudicate by the Acts, and failing that, must search scripture for direction;
but now it must go further and consult a binding secondary source of law.
The next step in the process was predictable for those areas of the law
which, like manslaughter, consistently fell under the supplementary rule:
specially enact it.
A Manslaughter Act was finally passed in 1719. The new law was a
curious hybrid of English and Puritan practices:
Be it enacted . . . That whatsoever persons shall be convicted of
the crime aforesaid, by confession or verdict, before any of the
superior courts shall forfeit to the publick treasury of this Col-
ony all their goods and chattels which to them belonged at the
time of their committing the said crime, and be further punished
by whipping on the naked body, and stigmatized or burnt in the
hand with the letter M on a hot iron, and be forever disinabled
in the law from giving verdict or evidence in any of his Majes-
ties courts in this government.17 9
This forfeiture accorded with English custom. The stigmatization had one
of two sources. It was an incident of a good plea of clergy at common law,
but, since English judges, more for leniency's sake, as often prescribed only
a perfunctory warming of the branding iron, the Connecticut statue saw fit
to emphasize that the mark be permanent.180 Alternatively, the branding
178. CONNECTICUT STATE ARCHIVES, I Civil Officers 180a. Contrast this resolution
with New York's first book of laws (1665) which directed that its enactments were to be
supplemented by the laws of England. I COL. LAWS N.Y. 45. J. GOEBEL AND T. NAUGHTON,
LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK, Intro. at xxiii (1944).
179. 6 CONN. RECS. 144.
180. Foster remarked that the court procedures attendant to a plea of clergy had degen-
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amounted to no more than the usual Puritan practice involving certain of-
fences like burglary which would have been capital in England. (The death
penalty was reserved only for repeat offenders). Whipping corresponded to
the traditional Puritan mode of punishment in cases requiring either severe
measures or death where for some reason that penalty was not to be im-
posed. English law did not call for it."8 Neither did that law prescribe
disablement.
It was on account of this last penalty that Francis Fane, the Crown's
legal advisor to the Board of Trade between the years 1725 and 1746,
whose task it was to prepare memoranda on the legality of various colonial
enactments for that body's deliberations, would call for the law's disallow-
ance in his Ninth Report (June 16, 1741), commenting that the additional
penalties were not "suitable to the crime" of manslaughter. 8 Clearly Fane,
who was as much troubled by most of the Mosaical capital laws-declaring
them to be "much in want of alteration," their scriptural pedigree notwith-
standing--could understand neither the moral weight of the disablement
nor that of public conviction of sin and humiliation. 183 In short, what he
could not perceive was the shadow of the Lex Mosis which overlay the com-
plex history of the enactment of 1719.
CONCLUSION
In the foregoing discussion, I have attempted to refocus attention on
the Bible law theory of Reinsch and Hilkey. Their conclusion of a diver-
gence of early colonial law from the common law, a specific rejection of the
subsidiary character of English legal thought in the law of crimes, its re-
placement by the law of God, and a system of discretionary magisterial
justice arising out of a predominately law interpretation of a biblical code
crated into "a nice piece of absurd pageantry, tending neither to the reformation of the of-
fender nor for example to others. ... M. FOSTER, supra note 129, at 372, 4 W. BLACK-
STONE COMMENTARIES *368-69.
181. Blackstone says that whipping was not substituted for branding until the statute 19
Geo. 3, ch. 74, only applying to manslaughter convictions and limited to not more than three
lashes. 4 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *371.
182. C. ANDREWS, supra note 43, at 190.
183. Id. at 65. Of the Capital Laws, Fane would have eliminated idolatry ("for atheism
and infidelity are very common in this age . . ."), id.; blasphemy he found too severe and
vague to merit death, id. at 66; witchcraft had been too much abused in New England he
thought, id.; he would have altered the provisions on rebellious children, inasmuch as these
were vague, uncertain and "would be attended with the greatest inconvenience," id. at 67.
Above all, Fane was alarmed at the wideranging discretion afforded Connecticut's judges, in
one case remarking that the law was "investing them with an extraordinary and arbitrary
power, much exceeding what any person or court ought to be trusted with." Id. at 99. Fane's
reports reflect an urbanity and rationalism which guaranteed his inability to understand the
peculiar nature of the Puritan community with which he has dealing.
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is-and in this I agree with the scholarship since Goebel's time-inaccurate
as a general explanation of the state of early colonial law. There remain,
however, elements of the theory that merit reexamination. Our more de-
tailed knowledge of colonial court records has undercut drastically their
view of a largely original American law, as well as their presumption of
some formal reception of English law. Nevertheless, despite this apprecia-
tion for the relative complexity and common law character of early colonial
private law proceedings, which point to a process of assimilation over time,
it is an overstatement to make the claim that the same process held true of
colonial criminal proceedings. The early Connecticut homicide materials
show not so much steady assimilation as belated surrender. The vitality of
the Mosaic Law lay not in its relentless application-the appearance of
chance medley, if ever so fleeting, puts that argument to rest-but in its
omnipresence in the minds of all who came to the bench and bar, and, as
the 1719 Manslaughter Act itself demonstrates, in the minds of those who
consciously sought to import English law into the colony's statutes. Mosa-
icism was never more apparent than real. The quintessential dilemma in the
criminal law of the time was, once the initial decision to ignore the English
common and statutory law of crimes had been made, how to tame the sim-
ple ferocity of the Lex Mosis to meet society's real crimes without repli-
cating the greater barbarities, incongruities and caprices of English prac-
tice, and without engendering angry cries of either too much discretion
among the magistrates or too little respect for God's Word. To note the
differences between the discretionary operation of chance medley in the lat-
ter portion of the seventeenth century, the open but cautious appeal to em-
ploy English manslaughter doctrine in 1712 and the decision at length to
incorporate that doctrine in the statutes in 1719, is to measure the extent to
which the view of New England as the New Israel had weakened but not
died.
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